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ABSTRACT
ALEXANDER PEARSON: Essays in Trade and Development.
(Under the direction of Simon Alder)
My dissertation focuses on the spatial aspects of trade and development. The first chapter looks at recent
improvements in border crossing and port efficiencies in Southern and Eastern Africa to estimate how such
trade frictions affect trade flows. I use a general equilibrium gravity model with multiple sectors and trade
with the rest of the world in order to capture both direct and indirect effects from border improvements. The
reduction of border wait times from an average of 30 hours to 10 is estimated to have increased internal trade
by 3.96 billion USD. This amounts to 21% of the total increase in trade between African countries between
2008 and 2014, with inland countries having a greater benefit. I further find an additional 9.46 billion USD
increase in internal trade flows when I equalize border wait times to those seen in developed countries.
The second chapter analyzes the effect of nine resource commodities on economic growth at the sub-
national level. Combining georeferenced data on resource locations with satellite data on night lights, I
estimate the causal effect of resources on district-level growth between 1992 and 2013, using exogenous
variation in the value of a mine due to changes in the world price of the corresponding commodity. I find
that districts that are resource-abundant grow more slowly than other districts in the country. However,
relatively faster growth in resource-abundant districts is observed in the following 5 years from the initial
year of a price increase. Furthermore, I estimate the spillover effects of resource-abundant districts within
their state and find large spillover effects not only on adjacent districts, but also on large cities. Finally, I
analyze the role of institutions for the distributional impact of mining regions. I find that the specific regions
that benefit from mining activity change given the institutional characteristics and revenue sharing policies
of the country.
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CHAPTER 1
WHY DON’T AFRICAN COUNTRIES TRADE MORE WITH EACH OTHER? THE ROLE OF
BORDER CROSSINGS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
1.1 Introduction
Although geographically close, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) trade relatively little with one
another. Intra-regional trade between countries in SSA amounts to 10% of total trade, a much lower per-
centage than in other geographical areas.1 Models that account for economic size, geographical distance
along with other characteristics such as common language, colonial links and exchange rates, predict trade
flows that would be higher than what are observed (World Bank 2009). Furthermore, the Linder Hypothesis
(Linder 1961, Bernasconi 2013, Fajgelbaum et al. 2011), which states that countries with similar character-
istics, usually measured in the literature by income distributions, will trade more with each other, seems not
to apply to countries in SSA.
The low levels of inter-regional trade has not been due to a lack of attention. The benefits of integra-
tion, which allows countries to take advantage of economies of scale and to reallocate resources to more
productive areas, have been advocated by African leaders and developmental agencies for several decades.
This has led to the formation of 14 regional economic communities (RECs), of which each country is a
member of at least one, with many countries being a member of several. These RECs have predominantly
been focused on reducing the tariffs on goods between the member countries, but with mixed results (World
Bank 2012). However, other characteristics of the region, such as poor transportation infrastructure and high
non-tariff barriers, can also have a substantial negative impact on the trade flows between countries. For in-
stance, in 2008, crossing the border from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Zambia took an average of
96 hours on top of having to drive on roads in poor condition and complete an average of 16 trade documents.
This paper studies this issue by investigating the impact of border frictions, primarily through border wait
1To compare with other regions, intra regional trade as a fraction of total trade is 60% in Europe, 53% in Asia, 50% in North
America, and 26% in South America.
1
times, on bilateral trade flows and analyzes their significance to regional integration in a general equilibrium
trade model. I focus my attention on two major RECs, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the East African Community (EAC), which significantly reduced their border wait times by
enacting one-stop border posts (OSBP) between 2008 and 2014.
I use border survey data taken before and after the OSBP were introduced and combine this with various
transportation cost variables such as the distribution and conditions of the road network, port efficiencies
and product-specific tariff rates. I then analyze the effect of border wait times on bilateral trade flows in two
steps. First, I estimate a reduced form gravity equation with importer-sector-year and exporter-sector-year
fixed effects using a long difference specification between 2008 and 2014. Taking advantage of the mul-
tiple borders that some countries have to cross along their optimal transport route in order to trade, I use
an identification strategy that relies on border crossings that are not controlled by the origin or destination
country. This allows me to find the direct effects of border wait times on bilateral trade flows. By measuring
the change in wait times, this analysis goes beyond the literature that estimates the effects of borders using
a dummy variable approach. I find that a 10% wait time decrease for a border that trading partners do not
control, yet still have to use, can increase trade between those partners by 3.36%. Furthermore, manufactur-
ing and agricultural products saw the largest responses to border wait changes.
Changes in bilateral trade costs can also have important indirect effects on other countries. Therefore
the second part of the paper uses a framework that incorporates these additional trade frictions into a general
equilibrium gravity trade model developed by Allen et al. (2014) that includes multiple sectors. I calibrate
the model using the time variation in the transportation costs and the corresponding trade flows for each
trading pair. I then use a series of counterfactuals that show how intra-regional trade was affected by vari-
ous improvements to border crossings and ports. For instance, to see how the recent OSBP improvements
affected the share of trade between countries in the SADC and EAC, I provide a counterfactual where no
border improvements occur. I find that overall trade would be 4.57 billion USD lower each year if the
borders were not improved to 2014 levels. With an approximate cost of between 3.5 and 30 million USD,
improving border crossing between countries offers a substantial return on investment.2 Furthermore 87%
of those gains were due to increases in trade within the region, suggesting that decreased border wait times
2The Kazungula border, however, is estimated to cost 220 million USD due to needing a rail and road bridge constructed to
substitute for the ferry operation, although construction has not started.
2
spurred economic integration instead of increasing the proportion of foreign trade. I also consider coun-
terfactuals that reduce border wait times to those seen in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development) countries and improve port efficiencies to the level of the country with the most efficient
ports, in terms of costs, which is China. These counterfactuals show that the increased port efficiency and
the elimination of wait times at border crossings yield large benefits.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature. Section 3 cov-
ers the relevant data used. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis using reduced form gravity equations.
Section 5 describes the general equilibrium trade model, which is then calibrated, and section 6 provides
counterfactual border friction scenarios. Section 7 offers conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review
The question of why African countries have such low trade with one another relates to a substantial liter-
ature on border effects and their relation to trade flows. The border effect puzzle came to attention with the
seminal work of McCallum (1996), who found abnormally large estimates of borders effects of trade flows
between the United States and Canadian provinces using a traditional gravity equation. This launched an
array of studies that tried to explain these high estimates and provide a theoretical foundation to the border
effect.3 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) provide an explanation for why the McCallum study found sub-
stantially overestimated border effects, stating that not accounting for multilateral resistance variables such
as remoteness led to omitted variable bias.4 Even accounting for remoteness, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) still find sizable border effects between Canada and the United States. Analyzing border effects by
looking at between and within country trade has the advantage of not requiring any information about the
frictions that the border actually causes. However, the effect of this artificial border may have a variety of
possible explanations as to why they inhibit trade such as differing regulations, border congestion, infor-
mation frictions and heterogeneous substitution of goods. This creates difficulties in explaining how any
particular aspect of borders actually affects trade flows between countries.
3These studies include different regions such as Europe (Nitsch (2000), Pisu and Braconier (2013) Reggiani et al (2014)), US
and Japan (Parsley, Wei, 2001), and other regions between America and Canada (Coughlin and Novy (2011) and Gandhi and Duffy
(2013) and also accounting for other variables (Hliberry (1999), Wei (1996), Frankel and Wei (1998), Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), Chen (2004), and Millimet and Osang (2007).
4Canadian provinces were estimated to trade 22 times more with other provinces than with the United States.
3
One way to solve this issue, as done in this paper, is to gather data on border characteristics that relate
to transportation costs. In their paper on the six major puzzles of international trade, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2001) transportation costs as a dominant factor in why these puzzles remain unsolved. However, almost
all the studies mentioned above use distance and tariffs to account for transportation costs. Although tariff
reductions were the major contributor to increased international trade over the last half-century, tariffs have
been reduced to negligible levels in many cases. Other costs to transport will thus be more significant in
explaining the continuing border effect (Baier and Bergstrand 2001). Although this area of research is rela-
tively untouched, a few papers do use other methods to measure transportation costs to account for the border
effect. Gandhi and Duffy (2013) use the extra security measures on the Canadian-U.S border to explain the
decline in trade share between the two countries. Pisu and Braconier (2013) look at the connectivity of road
networks between European countries and see that higher connectivity within countries accounts for 25%
of the reduction in trade among countries with borders them. Studies have also tried to apply this gravity
equation approach to trade between African countries including Akpan (2014), who looks at the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and estimates a gravity equation using distance and percent-
age of roads paved to account for transportation costs.
Although the study of border effects has somewhat neglected transportation infrastructure in its em-
pirical analysis, intra-country transportation infrastructure studies have been more prevalent. Chandra and
Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2008) look at how U.S counties were affected by the building of highways
that connected major cities from the 1950s onward. Banerjee et al. (2012) and Baum-Snow et al. (2013)
have done similar analyses for China’s road and rail development. Storeygard (2016) looks at the connec-
tions between hinterland cities in SSA and nearby major port cities and finds that the quality of connections
affects the rural city’s income, as measured by night time luminosity. Storeygard (2018) studies the impact
of road improvements between 1960 and 2010 on city population growth. Other papers focus on the effect
of infrastructure projects using structural models, such as the one developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002), to
obtain general equilibrium impacts on welfare. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2014) look at how land values in
18th-century America changed with the creation of the railroad system. Donaldson (2015) similarly looks at
colonial India to see how trade flows and welfare changed from the expansion of the railroad system. Alder
(2017) estimated the welfare effects of the construction of India’s Golden Quadrilateral Highway network
using luminosity data. Allen and Arkolakis (2014) create a general equilibrium model that incorporates the
topography of the country and determined that location accounts for at least 20% of the spatial variation in
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U.S incomes.
Finding data on the changes of non-tariff barriers that affect transportation costs can be difficult. There-
fore, studies have also looked at the variation in prices of commodity goods due to changes in transportation
infrastructure. Sotelo (2015) finds that an average farmer gains 16% in productivity and 4% in welfare due
to the paving of existing dirt roads in Peru. Atkin and Donaldson 2014 provide a method of dealing with
issues of using the price gap as a means of estimating trade costs and find that within-country trade costs
due to log distances are four to five times higher in Ethiopia and Nigeria than they are in the United States.
1.3 Data
In order to capture transportation costs, I first create a transportation network that accounts for the qual-
ity of the roads between all countries in the SADC and EAC (16 countries in all). The main data sources
are the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and the African Development
Bank Group, which provides details of the road networks in each country of the SADC and EAC for 2010.
The data includes information on road types and conditions.
Since there have not been efficiency studies to determine the speeds for certain roads in these countries,
I assign an approximated speed for each road given its type and condition. These approximations are calcu-
lated by taking roads of similar type and quality from data from the World Bank (2005) in India and Roberts
et al (2010) in China. Therefore, I assume that a new paved highway that was in good condition had a speed
of 70 km/h. For paved highways in poor or fair condition, a speed value of 40 km/h was assigned. Unpaved
dirt or gravel roads have a speed of 25km/h assigned. Locations that did not have any transportation net-
works, I assign a speed of 10 km/h to account for potential small unobserved trails.
Next, I supplement this transportation network by incorporating border crossing frictions between all the
countries. I use border specific survey data from 33 different crossings from the USAID, the World Bank and
the African Development Bank. Each country has at least one border crossing survey. Each survey has, at a
minimum, the wait time it takes to cross over to a specific neighboring country. If a neighboring pair does
not have survey data for that crossing, an average of the wait times for each country’s other border crossings
was taken. Since many of the unreported borders are in low-traffic areas due to being far from large cities
or main travel routes, I also conduct a robustness check in which the wait time for these unobserved border
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crossings is the average of low through-traffic crossings as reported by the World Bank (2010). Many border
crossings took days to get across with the highest being five days on average. Other borders had very low
wait times of a few hours. Many of the surveys also include monetary costs in fees that have to be paid to
cross the border. In this transportation network I allow movement only through the official border crossings.
With this transportation network, I then begin to construct transportation costs from each country in my
sample to the others. While a number of methods have been used to model transportation costs, Roberts
et al. (2012) shows that travel times provide a suitable proxy for overall transport costs. In order to obtain
transportation times in 2008 and 2014 from the constructed transport networks, I use a Dijkstra algorithm
in ArcGIS to find the shortest travel time between each of the main cities of each country to every other
main city in each country. To get the transportation costs to each country the location of the beginning and
ending points are important. This is especially true if there are many large cities in one country that are all
importing and exporting to other countries, leading to different travel costs for each city. To get around this
issue, I take the top three to five cities in each country and find the travel costs to get to every other city
in the other countries. Since cities may import or export more due to their relative size I use a weighted
average of each city’s travel costs weighted by their development in order to obtain a bilateral transportation
cost measure.5 For the main analysis in sections 4 and 5.3, I allow for the optimum route to change between
2008 and 2014 given the changes in border wait times. This leads to some trading partners having changes
in their road transportation times even though there were no large changes in the road speeds during this
time.6
Bilateral trade flow data was taken from UN Comtrade for the years 2008 and 2014.7 I use the two-digit
product classification, leading to 97 different product types. I use import data since import data tends to be
more accurate than compared to export data due to the fact that imports are more likely to be taxed.8 Some
countries did not report trade flows in 2008. For these countries, I use the export data from other countries
that did report to approximate their imports. For trade with the rest of the world I combine countries into five
5Since city-level measures of development are incomplete, I proxy for level of development by using the intensity of night time
luminosity.
6For robustness I also include analysis for when I keep the routes identical in both time periods.
7Additionally, I use IMF direction of trade (DOT) bilateral trade data to provide robustness checks.
8See World Bank 2010.
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groups: North America, 27 countries of the European Union, Asia, South America, and the rest of Africa.
Appendix Table A.1 shows the change in trade flows by sector and internal/foreign trade. We see that during
this time, trade between other countries in the SADC and EAC saw significant gains compared to trade with
foreign regions. This is especially true for the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Indeed manufacturing
goods traded internally accounted for nearly half of overall manufacturing trade in 2014.
Tariff data is obtained from two WTO databases, the Integrated Database and the Consolidated Tariff
Schedules. The latter also states whether specific countries have certain trade agreements with each other.
If no such trade agreement was listed, then the Most Favored Nations value was used. Incomes and Popu-
lations were taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Distance was constructed the same way
as travel times, i.e. taking the distance from the top cities in each country to the other cities in the other
countries. Common language, whether the country is landlocked and adjacency are other variables that
were used. Institutional variables such as rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability, and corruption
were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
1.3.1 Multi Modal Transportation
Several papers forgo the inclusion of interactions that are outside of the study area.9 Others incorporate
trade with the rest of the world (such as Turner (2015)), but assume sea trade to be constant during the period
of analyses. Adding accurate rest-of-world trade and the corresponding costs have the potential to change
one’s result significantly. This is even more of a concern in this case study since 85% of total trade is with
countries outside the study region.
The largest hurdle to incorporating different modes of transportation inside a general equilibrium model
is the problem of providing a unit cost or ad valorem cost that is compatible with each mode. This practice
is still in its infancy with no consensus on how it should be done. In southern and eastern Africa, road
transportation is the predominant method of transportation, whereas sea trade is mostly used for trading
with the rest of the world.10 In order to include the transportation network with the rest of the world, costs
9Donaldson and Hornbeck (2014) allow for trade to take place over water but only to other areas in the U.S. Donaldson (2013)
outlines four areas that can trade internationally within the Indian region for the particular good.
10Air transportation in Africa is also relatively common for trading with the rest of the world on the order of 10% (Hummels and
Schaur 2013). I exclude this and railway transportation in order to simplify the analysis.
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pertaining to port usage needed to be acquired. To do this, I used the World Bank’s Doing Business survey
which surveys local freight forwarders, customs brokers, and traders in 189 countries. For each country, the
survey breaks up the costs for both importing and exporting into domestic transport, border compliance, and
documentary compliance. Each country is assumed to import a container of auto parts valued at 50,000 USD
and weighing 15 metric tons. Exports are derived from each country’s leading export.11 It is also assumed
that the cargo is shipped from the largest city within the respective country. Travel times and costs are also
documented from the major city to the nearest border if the country is landlocked or the nearest port if not.
The survey also includes data on the time and costs to go from the primary city to the port or border. This
can give us an approximation of per-hour costs for road transportation. Section 4.2 goes over the strategy
of combining different modes of transportation together. The monetary value of time, the additional costs
at each port pair, and the tariff structure to the rest of the world gives most of the costs that are incurred
in transporting goods across borders. One large unknown is the role that road-blocks and bribes play in
each country. The data on transport cost to port or border may include these interactions but likely do not
report the detailed structure of road block locations or the magnitude of charges at these road blocks. This
however affects most studies concerning road transportation in developing countries and until reliable data
is available and correctly incorporated into the transportation networks there is little to be done.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section I estimate the effects of border wait times on trade flows using a reduced form gravity
equation. Gravity equations have been used extensively to estimate a wide variety of determinants in trade.12
Taking advantage of the border crossing surveys, I will be able to exploit the time variation to determine the
effect of border improvements on trade flows. To account for any lag in the response of trade to changes in
trade frictions, I conduct a long difference estimation with importer-sector and exporter-sector fixed effects
between 2008 and 2014 where all of the surveys and improvements were implemented. Let
∆ lnXsij = µ∆ lnTij + β1∆Zij + γis + δjs + ij (1.1)
where Xsij are trade flows from i to j in sector S, Tij is the sum of all border waiting times that i and
11These exclude goods such as diamonds and other precious metals; in these cases the second leading export is used.
12For a detailed overview see Head and Meyer (2010)
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j have to incur to trade with one another and Zij is the set of control variables including tariffs, road travel
times and port efficiencies if one of the trading partner is overseas.13
The importer-sector and exporter-sector fixed effects γis and δjs account for the unobservables that are
determinants to trade flows such as productivity, labor and capital prices and institutions. This method also
absorbs variables that we observe but that are time and country specific, such as income.14
Ideally the changes in border crossing wait times would come from events that were exogenous to coun-
tries decision to trade with one another. In practice, this may not be true. If two countries expected to trade
more with each other in the future, this may lead them to improve their border crossings to allow an easier
movement of goods. In this scenario, the goods might have been moved regardless, and the improved border
crossings could have little effect and would lead to an upward bias in the estimate for µ. The opposite may
also be true. For example, when consumers and firms in each country wish to trade with one another, it
may lead to higher protectionist measures from their governments. However, a key characteristic of having
many countries in the same region is that, when one country decides to change their border frictions with
their neighbor, regardless of their intent, other countries that use the border crossing to get to their other
trading partners, now have an exogenous change in their transportation costs. This is due to other countries
having very little influence on how the first two countries improve their transportation network. The more
thorough approach that I apply here is to use a border or a set of borders in between two non-adjacent trading
partners i and j, as an instrument for the total time cost between the respective trading partners. This subset
of border/borders will be correlated to the overall time cost but exogenous to i and j’s unobserved actions to
increase trade with one another. Furthermore, these non-adjacent countries account for only 1% of the trade
going through such that there is no reverse causality from trade to waiting times since they have little effect
on the congestion at these borders.
I therefore use a two-stage least squares estimate with the first stage defined as
13Section 4.2 goes over the case in which the independent variable T is the aggregate transportation friction from roads, ports
and border wait times with various robustness checks.
14This will partially limit the analysis by restricting the ability to look at other country time specific variables that may be of
interest such as corruption levels, the rule of law and other governance variables that will be absorbed into importer and exporter
year fixed effects.
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∆ lnTij = α1∆ lnBc + ψi + φj + νij (1.2)
Where c ∈ Ωij and Ωij is the set of borders that i and j have to go through to trade with each other and ψi
and φj are the importer and exporter fixed effects. Then we can use this to estimate the main equation by
∆Xsij = β1(αˆ1∆ lnBc + ψˆi + φˆj) + ∆Zij + γis + δjs + ij (1.3)
where αˆ1∆ lnBc + ψˆi + φˆj = ∆ ln Tˆij is the predicted values from (1.2).
Using an instrumental variable that only accounts for 1-2% of the total trade within the region raises
potential concerns. First the types of goods traded may be very different from the overall population of trade
flows. However, as we can see in Appendix Table A.2, the proportions of traded goods among sectors are
relatively similar to non-adjacent trade.
Another potential concern is the endogeneity of trade flows to border times due to congestion. All else
equal, an increase in trade flows between two countries would increase the traffic and the number of trucks
that would have to wait in line to go through the border resulting in longer wait times. This would lead to
the wrong conclusion that higher wait times leads to higher volumes of trade. To check for reverse causality,
I look at the effects of trade flows on border wait times by creating a measure for trade flows that is indepen-
dent of policy decisions and investment made during that time period. This can be found in appendix B.1.
However as mentioned before, when limiting my sample to non-adjacent countries, this endogenous effect
would be mitigated, since they account for only 1% of what is traded on the studied transportation network.
Therefore, any changes in trade flows between these countries will have a marginal effect on overall wait
times.
There has been a growing literature on the consequences of performing OLS on logged functions which
increases the likelihood of a heteroskedastic error term. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that this can be
accounted for by using other estimation techniques such as the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood esti-
mator. Not only do such alternatives account for the heteroscedasticity in the error term but they allow one
to account for zeros in trade flow data where they would otherwise have been thrown out.
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One important characteristics of this study is the quasi-random nature with which trading partners re-
ceive their trade frictions through border wait times due to their lack of control over non-adjacent borders.
However, if changes in border wait times are highly correlated between borders, it would suggest that there
are non-observables that could affect both border wait times and trading behavior among countries, leading
to biased estimates on border wait times. To check for this, I run an unbalanced panel regression of the
change in the border wait time of one of the trading partner’s own borders, on the average time change
of borders not controlled by either trading partner along their trade route. Since each country belongs to
many trade routes I also control for this by using country fixed effects. Appendix Table A.3 shows close to
zero correlation between borders controlled by trading partners and borders not controlled along their trade
routes with a t score of -.03.
Estimating equation 1.1 assumes that each product traded will be affected equally by border wait times.
However, a more likely scenario is that some products, such as agricultural goods, will be affected differently
than other goods such as copper which may not be as time sensitive. To see how trade costs are affected in
a per sector basis, I estimate
∆ lnXsij = µ
s∆ lnTij + β1∆Z
s
ij + γ
s
i + δ
s
j + 
s
ij (1.4)
where s now denotes the type of industry the traded good comes from. As mentioned in section 3, the
trade flow data is categorized by 97 products that can be aggregated into 15 sectors, which I did in order to
make the importer-sector-year and exporter-sector-year fixed effect matrices small enough to be computa-
tionally feasible.15
1.4.1 Gravity Equation Estimation Results
To see how border wait times affect trade flows following the specification in equation 1.1, I begin with
the 15-sector case excluding the rest of the world. This baseline result is shown in Table 1.1. Columns 1 to
3 show both adjacent and non-adjacent trading partners with column 3 including the full specification. As
we see, a 10% decrease in border wait times is expected to increase trade flows by 3.64%. However, when
taking into account the proximity of trading partners using distance, the effects of border wait times are
15 Found at http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm
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smaller when partners are farther away. That is, the trading partners that were farther than the median dis-
tance away from each other saw only a 1.2% increase in trade for every 10% decrease in border wait times.
This may be due to information frictions that make it more difficult for distant countries to take advantage of
lower trade barriers. When I disregard trade between adjacent countries within the study region there is still
a statistically significant negative relationship although with a lower magnitude which is consistent with the
findings in column 3 since, by construction, non-adjacent countries are farther away.
The estimates found for the effects of changes in the aggregate tariff rate on the change of trade flows are
reported to be positive. There are a number of potential ways to explain this counter-intuitive result. First, by
2008 tariffs were eliminated for all non-sensitive products. Once the minimum requirements were met for
the non-sensitive products, products on the sensitive list were required to be reduced as well. Many of these
particular products took longer to become duty free therefore, for these sensitive products, it could be the
case that the products expected not to be imported as often, were the easier products to reduce tariff rates on.
Additionally, the products that were expected to increase in imports in the future could give governments an
incentive to maintain tariffs at high levels for those products. Second, Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008) show
how using weighted aggregate tariffs can lead to endogeneity issues that underestimate the effects of tariffs.
As tariff rates increase and the number of imports subsequently goes down, the actual change in tariff rates
will be smaller due to the weight of that product decreasing. Finally, many of the tariffs still in place may be
over products that report zero imports. This eliminates the observation from the standard regression along
with the information that high tariffs reduced the imports of that product (to zero).
Appendix Table A.4 incorporates trade with the rest of the world and includes a control for port costs.
Changes in border wait times show similar effects when looking at southern and eastern African trading
partners and trade that occurs with the rest of the world. Changes in port costs during this time period corre-
lated positively with trade flows. A potential reason could be that higher trade volumes put larger demands
on ports than they have capacity for, which could raise costs.
To further identify the effects of border wait times on trade flows, Table 1.2 uses borders not operated
by the trading partners (but that they still have to pass through) as an instrument to control for the possibility
of wait times endogenously being reduced from expected trade flows. We see that changes in wait times
due to non-adjacent borders has larger effects on trade flows amounting to an increase of 4.57% in trade
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Table 1.1: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: No rest of world trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.184∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -0.161∗ -0.189∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗
(-1.71) (-3.42) (-6.97) (-1.75) (-2.00) (-2.99)
Change in Drive Times 0.00229∗∗∗ 0.00183∗∗∗ 0.000299 0.000277
(12.29) (8.31) (1.24) (1.00)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.778∗∗∗ 0.237∗
(5.94) (1.76)
Change in Tariffs 0.456∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(8.76) (10.78)
Number of Documents -0.461 -0.154
(-1.41) (-0.49)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent
N 3360 3360 3330 2505 2505 2490
R2 0.210 0.250 0.277 0.276 0.277 0.317
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and exporter-year-sector fixed effects with robust standard errors. t values reported in
parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
flows due to a 10% decrease in wait times. To see if an instrumental variable approach is needed, I conduct
a Durbin test and obtain a value of 4.44, which rejects the null hypothesis that the variables in the OLS
regression alone are exogenous and shows it as correct to treat border wait times as an endogenous variable.
In checking for weak instruments, I find an F-statistic of 697.67, with a threshold of 16.38 meaning I can
reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak.
Appendix Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 show estimates for equation 1.4, which allows for the elasticity of
trade flows due to border wait times to be different for each sector. Most sectors have been responsive to
the changes in border wait times. These tables show mostly the expected patterns, namely that sectors that
we expect to be more time sensitive have larger estimates. The sector of chemicals, leather, hide products,
footwear/headgear and metals were not statistically significant. These products may be less time sensitive
than agricultural products, which saw the largest sensitivity to changes in border wait times. This can be
seen in Appendix Table A.8, which shows the results of organizing trade into the three sectors of agriculture,
manufacturing and resource extraction. Although agricultural goods have the highest elasticity with respect
to border wait times when trading partners are close in proximity, the coefficient becomes virtually zero
when dealing with trading partners that are above the median in terms of distance. This can be expected as
many agricultural products have a short time window before they perish. Resource extraction products saw
the lowest response to changes in border wait times. Manufacturing products saw not only an 8% increase
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Table 1.2: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Instrumental variable approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.332∗∗ -0.442∗ -0.457∗ -0.457∗
(-2.12) (-1.87) (-1.95) (-1.95)
Change in Drive Times 0.00206∗∗ 0.00193∗∗ 0.00186∗ 0.00186∗
(2.25) (2.03) (1.96) (1.96)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.224 0.231 0.231
(1.02) (1.05) (1.05)
Change in Tariffs 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(3.06) (3.06)
Number of Documents 1.062
(1.19)
N 1246 1246 1246 1246
AR2 0.446 0.446 0.450 0.450
IV Results for Specification (4)
Durbin score 4.44 p = 0.0351
Wu-Hausman 2.7781 p = 0.0959
First Stage F-stat 697.677
First Stage Partial AR2 0.473
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are controlled for
importer-sector and exporter-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
in trade flows due to a 10% decrease in border wait times when trading partners were below median distance
apart, but also a 1.96% increase for trading partners that were above median distance from each other.
Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator
As mentioned above, the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator can provide additional insight
into the effects of transportation frictions, such as border wait times, on trade flows. Table 1.3 shows the
estimates when excluding trade with the rest of the world. The coefficient for the estimate of border wait
times are relatively similar to the estimates obtained when OLS with fixed effects was implemented. One
large difference is that the R-squared is higher for the PPML estimation than for the OLS with fixed effects
which could be due in part to the advantage of allowing zero values within the estimation. One issue that
arose in using OLS estimates was that tariff rates were positively correlated with trade flows. Allowing for
zero trade flows results in the estimates for tariffs having a statistically significant negative sign as we would
expect.
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Table 1.3: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes using Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border Wait Time (log) -0.444∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗
(-7.05) (-2.38) (-3.14) (-4.19) (-3.53) (-3.55)
DriveTime (log) -0.0386 0.270 0.297 0.294 0.269
(-0.21) (1.22) (0.85) (1.29) (0.81)
Tariffs (log) -0.126∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0360 -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0740∗∗
(-4.45) (-3.58) (-0.99) (-3.11) (-2.00)
Border-Distance Interaction -0.0967∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.0741∗ -0.105∗∗
(-2.18) (-2.11) (-1.72) (-2.06)
Sectors All All All Ag Manf Res
N 3874 2744 2744 1681 2105 1764
R2 0.910 0.942 0.943 0.947 0.936 0.946
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. All variables are
calculated by a 3 year average. Regressions are controlled for importer-year-sector and exporter-year-sector fixed effects.
t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
1.4.2 Measure of Combined Transportation Cost
Another method used in this paper is to create a transportation friction measure that incorporates the
changes in driving costs, border wait time costs and port costs. One benefit of this method is that it reduces
the number of parameters needed to calibrate the general equilibrium trade model. An additional benefit
comes from being able to analyze multiple modes of transportation using monetary values. Converting bor-
der and road friction measures into a monetary value however, requires information on the cost of time in
transit. Two different strategies are used in this paper to create this transportation cost measure as explained
below. It is important to note that increasing the monetary value of the wait time is equivalent to increasing
the weight of the importance of overall change in aggregate transportation costs.
Ad-Valorem Time Costs
One method for getting the ad valorem time costs is to use estimates from studies that measures the
cost of delays during transit. For instance, Hummels and Schaur (2013) estimate an equivalent .6 to 2.1%
ad-valorem tariff for every additional day in transit. When using a standard 20 foot container valued at
50,000 USD, we would expect costs to be between 300 USD and 1050 USD per day. For border crossings
it will be assumed that waiting 24 hours at a border is the same as a full day since the time was still counted
for overnight stays. Therefore, each hour would cost between 43.75 and 12.5 USD. Appendix Table A.9
converts each hour of waiting into 43.75 USD and Appendix Table A.10 into 12.5 USD. Columns 4 and 5
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in both tables again use non-adjacent borders as an instrument for the aggregate trade cost measure. We see
that changes in the value assigned to each hour of waiting does not significantly change the coefficient of
interest. I find that a 1% decrease in the cost of transportation between trading partners leads to a 1.16%
increase in trade.
Trucking Survey Costs Strategy
Another method for obtaining ad valorem costs would be to use the World Bank Doing Business survey
which includes the time and costs required to go from the primary city to the port or border. This can give us
an approximation of per hour costs for road transportation which I can then use to get the average marginal
cost of an additional hour of driving. Appendix Table A.11 shows that every hour adds on average an ad-
ditional 27 USD to transport costs, which is approximately the midpoint of the ad-valorem tariff estimates
found by Hummels and Schaur 2013. Appendix Table A.12 shows similar magnitudes to those found in
Appendix Tables A.9 and A.10 which were derived from the ad valorem estimate.
1.4.3 Robustness Exercises
Optimal Routes
One assumption made when constructing border wait time measures between bilateral trading partners is
that the optimal path is allowed to change given new border times between the countries. To check whether
this assumption will affect my results, I re-estimate Table 1.1 but hold constant the route used for travel.
Appendix Table A.13 shows the new results and Appendix Table A.14 uses the aggregated transport friction
measure holding the optimal route constant. In both instances the border friction measure remains negative
and close to what is found when allowing the route to change. This is most likely due to the fact that many
routes used in 2008 were still the optimal routes in 2014.
Symmetric versus Non-Symmetric Border Crossings
Although not all surveys reported times disaggregated to each direction, a large portion of them did.
It is assumed that if only one time was given for the border wait time it represented the average of both
directions. Therefore, I provide analysis both assuming that border wait times are symmetric, in which case
I take the average of each direction, and where the border wait times are non-symmetric, to the extent in
which the data is available. Appendix Table A.15 reports the estimates to the specifications made in Table
1.1 but assumes that borders are symmetric. Point estimates stay close to the main estimates which is not
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surprising as border wait times for each direction are similar.
Trade Flow Measures
When import data are not available between two trading partners but export data are available from the
other reporter, I assume that the amount of trade that occurred was equal to the export data of the other
reporter. Appendix Table A.16 uses data only for imports and records zero even if the respective trading
partner’s export data contradicts the import data. Appendix Table A.17 exclusively uses export data. Since
more zeros are recorded, Appendix Table A.18 uses the PPML estimator with import data exclusively which
allows for zero trade flows. Appendix Table A.19 then takes the average of the importer’s data and the ex-
porter’s data with little change in the estimates. I assume that goods are traded by road or by sea. However,
10% of African trade also takes place by air (Hummels and Schaur 2013). To account for this, I re-estimate
the reduced form model but exclude products that are more likely to be transported by air and obtain similar
results.16
Institutions
To analyze the effects that institutional characteristics have on how trade reacts to travel costs, I include
interaction effects for four different variables; regulation quality, rule of law, political corruption, and polit-
ical stability. Appendix Table A.20 shows that better regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability and
less corruption increases the amount of trade between partners when travel costs are decreased.
1.4.4 Limits to Reduced Form Gravity Equations
Although the fixed effects gravity estimator is one of the most common methods for estimating gravity
equations there remains one main limitation. Estimates of the border wait time variables only show the direct
effects on trade and do not take into account potential trade dispersion. The fixed effects gravity estimator
is able to control for this multilateral resistance term but cannot estimate the indirect effects of changes in
trade frictions on trade flows. This is a concern when conducting counterfactuals since the trade between
two trading partners not only depends on the changes in transport frictions between themselves, but also of
other trading partners. In the following section, I therefore use a general equilibrium trade model in order to
undertake counterfactuals.
16These product groups include flowers and other plants, fruits and vegetables, pharmaceuticals, essential oils and perfumes,
cinematographics, mechanical appliances/parts, foot and headgear/parts, medical/surgical equipment, and works of art.
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1.5 General Equilibrium Framework
A large number of microfounded general equilibrium trade models provide gravity equations for trade
flows. The first was the Armington model with intermediate inputs first used by Anderson (1979). Krugman
(1980) derived a gravity equation using monopolistic competition and homogeneous firms and intermediate
inputs while Meltiz (2003) used heterogeneous firms. Eaton and Kortum (2003) used a Ricardian perfect
competition model. Several other papers have extended these workhorse models, But these models face
difficulties in guaranteeing uniqueness and characterizing comparative statics, often using sub-optimal as-
sumptions to attempt both. Allen, Arkolakis and Takahashi (2014) provide a universal gravity model that
nests these other models and allows for uniqueness in equilibrium and closed-form comparative statics with
minimal assumptions.
1.5.1 Model Setup
In this section I define a general equilibrium trade model created by Allen et al (2014) allowing for
multiple sectors.17
Multi-Sector Model
Let the world be comprised of a set S ∈ (1, . . . , N) of locations. These locations can either be countries
or smaller administrative areas. For each location, Yi denotes the gross income andXij the value of location
j’s imports from location i. Trading between the locations is hampered by a corresponding trade friction
represented by Kij > 0. This represents the costs associated with trading between the two locations, such
as distance, time, and tariffs.
I include multiple sectors as non- tariff barriers and poor infrastructure may affect traded goods differ-
ently . For instance, large wait times at each border may make it difficult to transport a variety of agricultural
goods due to spoilage. Similarly, manufactured goods may need a variety of complex machines which re-
quires the speedy imports of crucial parts to prevent production disruptions due to broken parts. Waiting
weeks instead of days for these items may make it difficult to even set up manufacturing in the first place. To
account for this I extend the gravity model to include three sectors, agriculture, manufacturing and resource
17 Appendix A.1 provides a full description of the single sector model along with comparative statics. These can also be found
in Allen et al. (2014).
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extraction. Again, using work done by Allen et al. (2014) let s ∈ {M,A,R} be the set of sectors.
Next, I define, as in Allen et al (2014), (γi) and (δj) as the exporting and importing capacity respec-
tively; this accounts for the microfounded characteristics found in modern trade models, such as wages,
prices, productivities, and labor endowments. These two variables are solved endogenously within the gen-
eral equilibrium model, allowing us to make fewer assumptions of the underlying mechanisms that many
of the seminal trade models focus on while still providing the same outcome. Allen et al (2014) show that
four conditions, described below, must be met in this framework in order to obtain the general equilibrium
outcomes found in many of the current workhorse trade models.
Condition 1: For any country i ∈ S and j ∈ S, the value of aggregate bilateral trade flows is given by
Xsij = K
s
ij(γi)(δ
s
j ). (1.5)
Here, the importer shifters are equalized through each sector. This would be the case if there were no
frictions in the labor market in country i, which is assumed here. Ksij is interpreted as sector specific trade
frictions letting different commodities have different costs for transport.
The next two conditions are concerned with assumptions of goods market clearing and trade balance
that are made in almost all trade models. Specifically,
Condition 2: For any location i ∈ S
∑
j
Xsj,i = B
s
i Yi. (1.6)
That is, the total sum of all purchases from all locations, including its own location, is equal to their
income share for that sector for all locations. Next, we have
Condition 3: For any location i ∈ S
∑
s
∑
j
Xsi,j = Yi. (1.7)
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That is all exports, including the “exports” to their own location, must equal to their income. Although
common in the trade literature, this condition rarely holds for countries. Allen et al (2014) addresses this
concern and provides a strategy to account for unbalanced trade that will be included in estimation and the
counterfactual analysis.
The universal gravity model also assumes a log-linear parametric relationship between gross income and
the exporting and importing shifters:
Condition 4: For any location i ∈ S
Yi = Biγ
α
i
(∏
s
(δsi )
θs
)β
(1.8)
where α ∈ IR, β ∈ IR θs ∈ IR are the gravity constants and Bi > 0 is an (exogenous) location specific
shifter.18 These gravity constants control the response income has on the importing and exporting shifters.
In section 5.2, I estimate (α, β, and θs) to allow for the analysis of counterfactual scenarios.
The last condition pins down the equilibrium trade flows by normalizing gross incomes, taking advan-
tage of Walras’s law. Finally,
Condition 5: World income equals to one
∑
i
Yi = 1. (1.9)
Multi-Sector Comparative Statics
To see how trade frictions affect trade flows and welfare in the model, I take advantage of the work done
by Allen et al (2014) who derive comparative statics for the importer and exporter shifters. It is easy then to
show the general equilibrium effects for trade and welfare at any location given a change in bilateral trade
frictions between any two locations.
18In the Armington model (Armington 1969)Biwould be characterized by population and total factor of productivity for country
i. My main specification in the proceeding sections uses this same strategy.
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The addition of multiple sectors follows the same method as the single sector case above.19 The appendix
describes the construction of the multi sector comparative statics in detail. It is now possible to have a change
in transportation frictions in a specific sector between two countries affect trade between any other country
pair and sector. Specifically:
∂γl
∂Ksij
= Xsij(A
+
l,i +A
+
l,N+j)− csij
and
∂δs
′
l
∂Ksij
= Xsij(A
+
(s′N+l),i
+A+
(s′N+l),N+j
)− csij
where A+ is a (N + SN)× 2N matrix and the Moore pseudo inverse to the matrix
A =
(
(α− 1)Y βθ1Y −X1 . . . βθsY −Xs
αY −XT βθ1Y − E1 . . . βθsY − Es
)
where Y is a N ×N diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal is equal to Yi, Es is a N ×N diagonal matrix
who’s ith diagonal is equal to
Esi =
∑
j
Ksji exp{yj} exp{zi}
or location i’s total expenditure on goods in sector s. X and Xs are the total and sector specific N ×N
trade matrices respectively. Again, csij pins these values down due to our assumption of condition 5 which
states that world income equals one.20
Therefore the effect of a change in transportation frictions for sector s between countries i and j on trade
of sector s
′
from k to l is:
19The construction of the comparative statics for the single sector model can be found in the online appendix of Allen et al.
(2014)
20 Specifically:
csij ≡ 1
YW (α+ β
∑
s
′ θs′ )
Xsij
∑
l
Yl(α(A
+
l,i +A
+
l,N+j) +
∑
s
′
β(A+
(s
′
N+l),i
+A+
(s
′
N+l),N+j
))
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∂ ln Xˆs
′
kl
∂ ln Kˆsij
=
∂lnγj
∂lnKsij
+
∂lnδs
′
k
∂ lnKsij
= Xsij(A
+
l,i +A
+
l,N+j) + (A
+
(s′N+l),i
+A+
(s′N+l),N+j
))− 2csij
and income changes for country l is defined by.
∂lnYl
∂lnKsij
= α
∂lnγl
∂lnKsij
+ β
∑
s′
θs
′ ∂lnδs
′
l
∂lnKsij
=
Xij × (α(A+l,i +A+N+l,j + csij) + β
∑
s′
θs
′
(A+
(s′N+l),i
+A+
(s′N+l),N+j
+ csij)
1.5.2 Model Estimation
Section 5.1 described a model in which for any given α, β, θs, income shifters Bsi and trade frictions
Ksijt, a unique general equilibrium could be solved by a set of endogenous import and exporter shifters.
This subsection will address the estimation of α, β and a trade cost parameter µ using the trade flow and
travel time data, which allows for the opportunity of counterfactuals and welfare analysis in section 6. I
use the method in Allen et al (2014) which takes advantage of the general equilibrium structure of the
model. The approach calculates the importer and exporter shifters directly from the model and predicts the
corresponding trade flows. It then estimates the gravity constants and trade cost parameter µ by taking the
least squared errors between the observed change in trade costs and the predicted change.
(α∗, β∗, θ∗1, . . . , θ
∗
s , µ
1∗, . . . , µs∗) = arg min
α,β∈IR,µ∈IRS∑
s
∑
i
∑
j
(
ln Xˆsij
observed − ln Xˆsij
predicted)2
. (1.10)
As in Allen et al (2014) the method used to calibrate (α∗, β∗, θ∗1, . . . , θ∗s , µ1∗, . . . , µs∗) is through a grid
search. A computationally intensive strategy would be to solve the model to obtain Xˆsij
predicted
for each it-
eration. To simplify the estimation procedure, I follow Allen et al (2014) and take first order approximations
to both ln γˆi and ln δˆsj such that
(α∗, β∗, θ∗1, . . . , θ
∗
s , µ
1∗, . . . , µs∗) = arg min
α,β∈IR,µ∈IRS
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∑
s
∑
i
∑
j
(
ln Xˆsij
o − Tˆ ′sijµ− ln γˆi
(
Tˆ µ;α, β, θ
)−∑
s
ln δˆsj
(
Tˆ µ;α, β, θ
))2 (1.11)
where
ln δˆsj
(
Tˆ µ
) ≈∑
s′
∑
k
∑
l
∂ ln δˆsj
∂ ln Kˆs
′
kl
Tˆ sklµ
s (1.12)
and
ln γˆi
(
Tˆ µ
) ≈∑
s′
∑
k
∑
l
∂ ln γˆi
∂ ln Kˆs
′
kl
Tˆ sklµ
s. (1.13)
I calibrate the set of parameters in two steps. First, I estimate the set of optimal trade parameters µs∗. It
can be shown that equation 1.11 can be written as
µ(α, β, θ1, . . . , θs) =((
D(α, β)Tˆ
)′(
(D(α, β)Tˆ
))−1(
D(α, β)Tˆ )
)′
yˆ (1.14)
where Tˆ denotes a SN2 ×M vector whose 〈i + j(N − 1)〉 is the 1 ×M vector Tˆ ′sij , D(α, β) is the
SN2×N2 matrix with 〈i+ j(N − 1), k+ l(N − 1)〉 representing ∂lnX
s
ij
∂Kskl
, and yˆ denotes the N2× 1 vector
whose 〈i+ j(N − 1)〉 row is lnXˆsij
o
.
Therefore for any α, β, θ1, . . . , θs, µs can be estimated using ordinary least squares on the general equi-
librium transformed explanatory variable Tˆ s
GE
ij :
ln Xˆsij = (Tˆ
s
GE
ij )
′µs + sij (1.15)
where
Tˆ s
GE
ij =
∑
s′
∑
k
∑
l
∂ ln Xˆsij
∂ ln Kˆs
′
kl
Tˆ skl
and
∂ ln Xˆs
′
ij
∂ ln Kˆskl
=
∂lnγi
∂lnKskl
+
∂lnδs
′
j
∂ lnKskl
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The second step is to find the gravity constants α, β, θ1, . . . , θs which minimize the total squared errors.
As shown in Allen et al. (2014) this can be written as
(α∗, β∗, θ∗1, . . . , θ
∗
s) =
arg min
α,β∈IR
yˆ
(
I − Tˆ
((
D(α, β)Tˆ
)′(
(D(α, β)Tˆ
))−1(
D(α, β)Tˆ )
)′)
yˆ. (1.16)
Using a three-sector version requires solving five parameters. I perform a grid search to limit the con-
trol space then, taking the set of parameters, perform a random search around those values to calibrate the
parameters.
This method does use approximations to the fully solved model approach in order to obtain the cali-
brated parameters. Appendix B.2 compares both methods using Monte Carlo simulations and finds that the
approximation approach provides similar results to the fully solved model approach but in a fraction of the
time.
1.5.3 General Equilibrium Calibration Estimation Results
Table 1.4 shows the results for equation 1.15 with various gravity constants of alpha and beta. Row
1 shows estimates when minimizing equation 1.14 from section 5.2 which results in α = −23.00 and
β = −1.40. By construction the R squared will be the largest among the comparisons. However, the cal-
ibrated values for alpha and beta were able to explain more of the data than calibrated results in similar
exercises in Allen et al. (2014) which maximized the gravity constants with an R-squared of 0.0234. It
is also useful to note that although the GE estimation results in a lower R squared than the fixed effects
estimation, the GE estimation is only using one covariate rather than over 40 for the fixed effects estimation.
The coefficient indicates that for a 1% reduction in trade frictions, both directly from a country having lower
transport costs or indirectly from other countries having higher transport costs to their partners, results in
a .62% increase in trade flows with high statistical significance. Row 2 shows the alpha and beta values
calibrated from Allen et al. (2014). Row 3 are values found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) when the trade
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elasticity value is converted to a value that corresponds with the universal gravity model, and Row 4 shows
values found in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The explanatory power in values found in other papers appears
to be low when applied to the SADC and EAC. This may be due to developing countries reacting differently
to transportation changes than developed countries,from where these other gravity constants were estimated.
Table 1.4: GE single sector results
Type alpha beta µ StdEr R2
Own Calibration -23.00 -1.40 -0.62 0.0154 0.0819
AAT Calibration -30.20 -27.90 -2.36 0.4454 0.0089
EK -3.85 -3.04 -0.10 0.0790 0.0001
AL -0.67 -0.33 -5.76 3.3252 0.0008
Coefficients for µ represent the estimated coefficients of the general equilibrium estimation given various values of the
gravity constants. AAT Calibration represents the alpha and beta values calibrated from Allen et al (2014), EK are values
found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and AL are values found in Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
When looking at a three-sector case and using the calibrated values for α and β found in the single sector
model, we see in Appendix Table A.21 large gains in the explanatory power of the data in the manufacturing
sector but less in agriculture and resource extraction. All three sectors have negative and significant coef-
ficients with manufacturing being of the largest magnitude. Figure A.1 shows the R-squared values of the
general equilibrium estimation over combinations of different parameters. We see that there are clear local
maxima with a smooth increase in R-sqaured to the calibrated parameter values.
1.6 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section I provide counterfactuals by taking two approaches. The first is using the reduced-form
gravity equation with importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. Although this is the most prevalent way
of analyzing trade behavior, the drawback is that general equilibrium effects cannot be properly controlled
for. The second approach uses the universal gravity general equilibrium model. I look at three counterfac-
tuals. The first is a scenario in which none of the improvements in borders or ports were enacted between
2008 and 2014. The second is a scenario of borders being at least as efficient as 3 hour wait times. The last
scenario is to assign all ports in the SADC and EAC the same efficiency as Chinese ports in terms of costs.
Each of these scenarios will be first analyzed in an aggregate setting and then broken up into three sectors
of agriculture, manufacturing, and resource commodities.
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1.6.1 No Border Improvements
Appendix Table A.22 illustrates the general equilibrium effects on trade from assuming that no border
improvements were made between 2008 and 2014 and that border wait times were that of 2008 levels. We
see in the agriculture sector, taking a weighted average with respect to countries’ income, that trade would
be negatively affected by 12.85 percentage points of the growth of internal trade during that period. This
implies that instead of the actual 49.3% increase in agricultural trade during this period, it would be esti-
mated to be 36.45% if no border improvements were made.
Table 1.5 disaggregates the effects between internal and foreign trade for each sector. We can see that
manufactured goods traded internally would be hardest hit with an estimated decrease of 17.89 percentage
points from the actual growth which was 102.26% over the time period. Converting this to actual dollar
amounts and looking at all sectors, I find that 3.96 billion USD of the 18.6 billion USD increase in internal
trade was generated by implementing the border improvements. Therefore, when including the .612 billion
USD increase in foreign trade attributed to reduced border frictions we can begin to calculate the benefit
of improved border crossings at an estimated 4.57 billion USD. A report by the SADC estimated the cost
of improving many of the larger border crossings to be anywhere between 3.5 million USD and 25 million
USD. This suggests that the borders quickly pay for themselves and provide significant value in terms of
trade every additional year that they are maintained.
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Table 1.5: Percentage point change in trade patterns with no improvements: for internal and foreign trade.
Universal gravity model approach
Country Internal trade Internal trade Internal trade Foreign trade Foreign trade Foreign trade
Agriculture Manufacturing Resources Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola -21.40 -17.34 -13.30 -6.81 -2.79 -1.08
Botswana -28.40 -35.03 -57.57 -0.67 15.73 -5.62
Burundi -36.25 -16.73 -29.66 -17.31 -98.54 -22.59
Congo; Dem. Rep. -37.14 -29.13 -39.03 -13.12 -75.62 -10.25
Kenya -18.53 -80.06 -7.70 -2.00 -5.51 0.70
Lesotho -6.23 -27.61 -17.18 2.32 -28.06 4.06
Malawi -22.16 -11.35 -3.80 -6.95 -34.04 -6.43
Mozambique -47.91 -29.94 -48.55 -1.90 14.06 -8.89
Namibia 4.64 36.45 1.67 1.49 7.83 1.15
Rwanda -0.42 -59.82 -6.57 -5.75 -12.78 6.34
South Africa -8.73 -6.41 -1.75 0.51 14.95 0.89
Swaziland -15.19 -82.37 -11.17 1.96 -5.01 -6.98
Tanzania -12.11 -18.33 -8.18 -2.68 2.88 -1.94
Uganda -0.21 -35.51 -13.00 -4.67 -23.18 -3.11
Zambia -7.97 -5.58 -14.48 0.97 14.63 2.62
Zimbabwe -1.74 23.79 -3.09 0.86 28.10 -1.96
Weighted Avg -13.87 -17.89 -9.52 -2.15 3.04 -0.71
Table shows the percentage point difference in the growth of trade flows between the counter-factual scenario of no border
improvements and the observed growth in trade from 2008 to 2014.
1.6.2 Efficient Border Crossings
Next, I create a hypothetical scenario in which border waiting times are reduced to 3-hours, similar
to that between OECD countries who have established border crossings. Appendix Tables A.23 and A.24
show overall percentage point changes to trade expected from having no borders. This scenario would lead
to agricultural trade growth of 60.44% between 2008 and 2014 instead of the actual 49.3%. Trade in man-
ufacturing products would see smaller increases with an added 4.32% over the time period with resource
trade seeing an additional 9.2% increase. Splitting up trade between internal trade and foreign trade shows
that internal trade would significantly increase, particularly in manufacturing products, while foreign trade
would stay relevantly constant or even decrease.
1.6.3 Ports Like China
Allowing for the ports to have the same efficiencies as those in Chine, which were the most efficient
ports according to the 2014 Doing Business surveys, Appendix Table A.25 shows the estimated counterfac-
tual of increased port efficiency when using the fixed effects gravity estimation described in section 5.1. The
reduced form approach has the disadvantage of not accounting for general equilibrium effects. Therefore,
decreasing port costs would have no effect on trade between countries in the SADC and EAC. The results
show that trade in manufacturing goods would gain the most, a 5.7% increase, and that landlocked countries
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stand to benefit most. Agricultural products would see the least increase in trade with the rest of the world.
Using the universal gravity model, Appendix Tables A.26 and A.27 show similarities among the benefits
due to improved ports, with manufacturing seeing the largest gains at 6.03%. Agriculture and resource trade
would improve 2.9% and 2.0% respectively. Breaking up trade by exports to the rest of the world, we see
large increases in manufacturing (7.6%) and agriculture (3.5%) with little effect on resource trade (0.6%).
Unlike with the reduced form counterfactual, here we can begin to look at the effects of port conditions
on trade between SADC and EAC countries. On average, the effects of increased port efficiency would be
negligible. However, some countries could see moderate effects. Zimbabwe, for instance, would see a 1.2%
decrease in resource exports to other countries in the SADC and EAC.
1.7 Conclusion
It has been argued previously that insufficient transportation infrastructure is one of the main compo-
nents in limiting trade and, consequently, growth within developing countries. This is particularly true in
Africa where many landlocked, remote or low population density countries have to trade with large within
and cross-border transportation frictions. This topic also concerns the facilitation of regional integration,
particularly through large-scale investments by governments and NGOs to strengthen domestic trade and
development. However the usual interdependence of transportation infrastructure, trade and development
make it difficult to determine the actual effects that additional investments in transportation infrastructure
would have on integration, trade and thus development.
Furthermore, the effects of transportation infrastructure such as roads, ports, and borders on trade flows
have been empirically difficult to study due to the dichotomy between countries who have large transporta-
tion infrastructure projects but sparse trade flow data, and the countries who have ample trade flow data,
but little time variation in their transportation infrastructure over data available time periods. This paper
begins to bridge this gap by looking at a multi-country region that has significantly reduced trade costs due
to investments in border and port infrastructure in a relatively short period.
I find that the improvements in border crossings throughout southern and eastern Africa have contributed
to the overall trade increase with significant benefits to intra-regional trade in manufacturing and agriculture.
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The paper also shows the importance of methodologies not found regularly in the literature such as compar-
ing reduced form versus general equilibrium results, including certain trading partners like the outside world
and incorporating multi-modal transportation networks. Allowing for the analysis to include other modes of
transportation such as air and rail would give a deeper understanding of how infrastructure can affect trading
behavior.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF COMMODITY PRICES AND MINES ON SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM SATELLITE DATA
2.1 Introduction
The growth of large economies like China can have a significant impact on resource abundant countries
due to their increasing demand for raw materials that are used to build manufactured goods and large-scale
infrastructure projects. For instance, iron ore production tripled between 1992 and 2013, and at the same
time, real prices went from 33 USD per dry metric ton (dmtu) in 1992 to 151 USD/dmtu in 2008 before
coming down again to 127 USD/dmtu in 2012. Local and national governments that are endowed with an
abundance of resources are naturally interested in the regional effects that large commodity price increases
will bring. However, whether resource abundance fosters economic development or leads to a resource
curse, particularly at a subnational level, is still being debated with no clear consensus.1
This paper provides a new approach to measuring the effects of resource abundance and mining activity
on economic development, by exploiting both between and within-country variation, a task that has been
difficult due to data constraints. Looking at district level growth and district-specific resource abundance
gives insights on where the effects are being felt within the country. In addition to this, looking at over 100
countries then allows for the control of country- and time-specific non-observables, which cannot be done
when studying a single country. This allows me not only to determine whether mining districts benefit or not
from the mining activity, but also determine which regions in the country are benefiting from the additional
revenues at a multi-country level.
Since income data are rarely collected at a subnational level for many countries that are of interest, I use
night-time luminosity data from 1992 to 2013, which has been demonstrated to be an adequate alternative to
1 Abubakr et al. (2017) provides a ‘survey of surveys’ of the literature that concludes that the evidence for the resource curse is
convincing whereas John (2011) provides a similar survey that reaches a different conclusion.
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measuring GDP growth when other data is not available (Henderson et al. 2012). In order to quantify the re-
source abundance of a district, I use spatial data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) that has
surveyed 305,000 different resource locations worldwide documenting size, type of resource, operational
activity and ownership. Using exogenous world pricing data from the World Bank Commodity Market Out-
look’s (CMO) dataset, I then estimate the interaction effects of prices and resource abundance on yearly
night-time luminosity. Controlling for country-year and district fixed effects, I find that districts with high
mining activity tend to grow more slowly than other districts after an initial price increase. However, subse-
quent periods show an increase in economic activity within the mining district from the initial price increase
for up to five years. A one standard deviation in a price increase leads to an estimated .95 percentage points
slower growth for the mining districts for the initial year. However, mining districts see an average of .92
percentage points faster growth in development for the following 4 years after the initial price increase.
Taking advantage of the spatial nature of the data, I measure the spillover effects of mining and resource
abundant locations on other locations. I find that districts adjacent to mining areas and large cities located
within the same state saw similar responses to world price changes as the mining districts, suggesting that
cities in resource-rich states depend, to a certain degree, on mining activity in the state for additional growth.
I then determine the role of institutional characteristics and conflict on both the impact on mining dis-
tricts and the distributional effects that mining locations have on their states from exogenous world prices.
I find that low corruption and high rule of law mitigate the slow growth seen initially and accelerates the
growth in subsequent years when world prices increase. In addition, higher levels of external conflict also
increased the long-term development of these districts. To analyze the role of institutional characteristics
on the distribution of development due to mining activity within a state, I estimate separate responses for
four groups of countries that represent different institutional qualities by using a clustering method for bu-
reaucratic quality, corruption and rule of law measures.2 I find that countries that have higher bureaucratic
quality, low corruption and higher rule of law distribute the effects of mining activity throughout the state.
Countries that exhibit weak institutional characteristics see state administrative capitals grow faster than
average when world prices increase. I conduct a similar analysis using three conflict measures: internal
conflict, external conflict and ethnic tensions. I find that countries with high internal conflict and ethnic
tension, but low levels of external conflict see districts within mining states have negative spillover effects
2See Sumner and Vazquez (2014) for a similar methodology to classify developing countries over time using economic devel-
opment, human development, better governance, and environmental sustainability indicators.
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on growth when prices increase.
Finally, in order to look more closely at policies that determine where mining revenue is spent, I focus
on three proximate countries, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, who have remarkably different resource revenue
sharing policies. The analysis shows significant differences in the distributional effects of mining activities
that correspond to the country’s overall revenue sharing arrangements and government structure.
The organization of this paper is as follows: The next section provides a brief review of the literature
related to this paper. Section 3 will discuss the data used while section 4 provides the empirical strategy.
Section 5 describes the results, section 6 provides the case study of Chile, Argentina and Brazil, and section
7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The question of whether an area’s resource endowment helps or hinders its development has been de-
bated already in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in which, talking about the development of mines, he
says a ”...prudent lawgiver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to give any
extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards them a greater share of that capital than that would go to
them of its own accord.”3 In recent years the idea again became popular with the work of Sachs and Warner
(1995, 2001) who showed that countries that had higher resource dependency as a fraction of their GDP
would have lower growth than those with lower resource dependence. Similar results were shown by Enger-
man et al. (1997), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Melhum et al. (2007) and Humphreys et al. (2007). However,
a growing amount of literature has come out arguing against the idea of resource endowment being a curse to
the economy. Manzano and Rigobon (2007) provide two issues that they find in the resource curse literature.
First, if using a cross-section of the data, individual country characteristics that may be unobserved could
be correlated with the independent variables leading to biased estimates. They provide a two-time-period
and four-time-period panel data set to control for country fixed effects and find that the negative effects of
3Adam Smith’s mention is considered the first to be recorded discussing this issue. More recently, theories for resources causing
harm to an economy were stated by Watkins (1963), Corden and Neary (1982) and Auty, R. (1993).
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resources disappear.4 Second, GDP, which is what the majority of these studies use as their dependent vari-
able, includes the resource sector that can create a misleading relation between resource endowments and
growth. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) also note that using resource dependency, measured by exports
of resources over total GDP, leads to endogeneity issues, and using stock-based measurements of resources
would be superior.
More recently, studies have been analyzing how the resource curse can affect regional development
using individual countries with, again, conflicting results. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) find that natural
resource abundance decreases local investment, schooling, and openness when looking at American states.
Ivanova (2014), looking at regions in Queensland Australia, found that the majority of revenue obtained
from mining would go to other major metropolitan areas and, in some places, reduce diversification and
forward and backward linkages to other regions. There has also been evidence, however, that resource en-
dowments actually benefit local regions. Michaels (2011) finds that regions in the southern states of the
U.S. that had large amounts of oil reserves had higher growth and increased manufacturing employment
along with better infrastructure. Domenech (2008) showed that regions in Spain were benefited in regards to
industrialization from having higher values of mineral endowments between 1860 and 1936. One negative
aspect of looking at regional development within a single country is that the results are difficult to apply to
other countries due to country-specific observable and unobservable characteristics.5 This paper will allow
for both country-time varying unobservables while still analyzing development changes at a local level for
all countries. The estimation strategy used in this paper follows closely to those found in Berman et al.
(2017), who look at 50km by 50km regions in Africa and analyze the effects of mineral activity, interacted
with world prices, on various conflict measures.
Another related field is the literature on the impacts of short-run demand shocks on country and regional
development. Examples include Black et al. (2005), who look at the boom, peak and bust of the coal mining
4Manzano and Rigobon (2007) are unable to add more time elements due to data constraints for the majority of countries.
Collier and Goderis (2012) also provide a panel data approach and find short-term gains and long-term losses from non-agriculture
commodities. However, Collier and Goderis (2012) run into the endogeneity problem of having the dependent variable being a
function of resource shares.
5There are several more benefits to looking at single country cases that help disentangle some of the mechanisms behind how
resource endowments affect regional development that this paper has to abstract from. For instance, Borge, Parmer and Torvik
(2015), observing resource revenue to local governments from hydropower in Norway, found that regions with higher hydro revenue
had less efficiency in producing public goods a term they call the paradox of plenty, but did not find evidence that the revenue from
hydropower was any less efficient than other revenue sources such as taxes.
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industry in four U.S. states, finding positive spillover effects to other districts, but no evidence of nega-
tive spillover effects. Addison et al. (2014) look at commodity pricing shocks in 14 Sub Saharan African
countries and estimate, using vector autoregressions, the asymmetric response that prices could have on per
capita incomes. Little evidence was found that either unexpected increases or decreases in commodity prices
affected per capita income. Collier and Goderis (2012) also use vector autoregression models on a larger
sample and longer time period (45 years) and find that positive commodity price shocks have short-term
benefits and long-term negative consequences at the country level.
Finally, this paper is also related to a large body of literature that estimates the effects of institutional
characteristics and the degree of conflict on economic development, particularly when countries are resource
abundant. Mehlum et al. (2006) show that institutions play a significant role in countries falling into the
resource curse. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) provide a survey of the various channels in which resource abun-
dance of an area can increase the probability of conflict.
2.3 Data
In order to analyze the effects of mining activity both between and within countries, a combination of
spatial and country level data is needed. This section details the specific data needed for this analysis.
2.3.1 Mining Data
As mentioned in the preceding section, using resource income as an explanatory variable to explain
economic growth can lead to endogeneity issues. However, using stock measures for resource abundance
mitigates this problem as suggested by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). Therefore, to identify each dis-
trict’s resource abundance, I use the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) Mineral Resource Data
System (MRDS) that contains 305,000 different resource locations around the world (USGS 2005). These
locations are broken down into over 30 different commodities and provide details on whether the area was
a past producer, current producer, occurrences not yet actively mined upon, and refining locations. Mines
are also, when available, classified into three different production sizes; small, medium or large.6 For this
6Although the specific amounts are not readily available for mines over the sample period, quantities were recorded for some
past producers. I find that iron production of small mines amounts to 414528 metric tons (mt), 1,012,110 mt for medium mines and
3,608,952 mt for large mines.
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study, I include nine mineral resources: iron, copper, aluminum, tin, zinc, nickel, coal, gold, and silver. 7
In order to track the economic impact these mines have over time, I use exogenous world prices for each
commodity from the World Bank Commodity Market’s (CMO) pink sheet. These provide averaged annual
data on various resource commodities in real dollars.
2.3.2 Administrative Areas
To capture administrative areas within each country, I use the Global Administrative Areas (GADM)
shapefile for the entire world. These administrative areas are organized by country, state, and district/county.
For this analysis, I use the district/county administrative area which allows me to use country-year fixed ef-
fects in order to account for country- and time-specific unobserved heterogeniety. To identify key districts
within each state, I use Natural Earth and Esri’s world populated area datasets. These identify country level
capitals, state-level capitals and large populated cities within each district. Of the 256 countries and entities
in the dataset, 120 report mining and resource locations within their borders.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: District Level
Observations Mean Standard deviation Median
Sum of night light (ln)
all districts 1,033,032 6.508 2.688 6
if mines >0 49,148 7.693 2.708 8
if mines = 0 983,884 6.449 2.673 6
Annual growth of night light (%)
all districts 939,120 7.82 7.47 5.42
if mines >0 44,680 6.50 6.65 2.29
if mines = 0 894,440 7.94 7.51 4.91
Number of mines in mining districts
all types 115,808 6.453 24.199 2
large 17,336 2.482 4.337 1
medium 27,522 2.163 2.512 1
small 78,914 6.892 22.268 2
producers 49,148 4.228 8.444 2
past producers 49,874 6.566 29.545 2
prospects 99,308 3.458 6.166 1
government mines 18,348 1.819 1.878 1
Source: Authors’ computation from MRDS and DMPS-OLS datasets
7These mineral resources were chosen due to their quality of data in the MRDS and their economic significance in making
machines, electrical components and a large portion of the other goods produced in the world.
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2.3.3 Measuring Growth at the Sub-National Level Using Luminosity Data
To proxy for GDP growth, I use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s (DMPS) Operational
Linescan System (OLS), which was primarily used to detect cloud cover but also captures light emitted from
human activity proceeding sunsets. The growth in light emission for an area has been shown to correlate
strongly with the growth in GDP for the area (Henderson et al., 2012). This data is available yearly from
1992 to 2013. The cell sizes are 30 arc seconds or roughly 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer. Each cell contains
a value between 0 and 63 with 0 representing zero light emission and 63 representing the brightest that the
satellite can measure. Areas that emit a large amount of light, such as cities, have the potential to hit the
top-coded value.8 This would lead to an underestimated growth value for these areas. A series of satellites
were deployed for the 22-year period to make sure quality of the images were preserved. However, each new
satellite that replaced the older version may have a slightly different calibration on recording night lights.
Since most satellites overlap with each other over time, I create growth rates of night lights only within each
satellite in order to maintain the same calibration of values while still obtaining a growth rate in each year.
Descriptive statistics for district level luminosity and mining activity can be found in Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Institutional Data
To see how districts may be affected by the institutions of the country, I use two data sources. The first
is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. This includes
11 variables such as corruption, internal conflict, military in politics, law and order and bureaucracy quality
at an annual rate between 1984 to 2007 for 145 countries. The second data source is the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI), which contains data from 1996 to 2014 for over 200 countries and territories. This
dataset creates 6 variables derived from 31 data sources that use surveys and expert assessments to gather
a perception of the country’s governance capabilities. These variables include voice and accountability, po-
litical stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
and control of corruption. The prevalence of resources in a country or state could have major influences
on the quality of institutions (Ross 2001) or conflict within a country (Berman et al. 2017). Additionally,
increases in the development of a country can affect institutions leading to potential endogeneity issues.9
8Although the ‘intensive’ growth of the city will be muted, the extensive margin can still be measured. Additionally, I provide
a robustness check whereby I exclude districts who have a large proportion of their cells to be top-coded and find no significant
impact to the overall results.
9In order to account for this, I use initial values of institutional characteristics.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
I first discuss the identification strategy and describe the baseline analysis of the effects of resource-
abundance on economic growth using exogenous price changes. Second, I analyze the role that institutions
play in the development of resource-heavy areas. Third, I provide ways to measure the spillover effects
of resource-rich areas and analyze the interaction that these areas have with capital cities and large popu-
lated areas. Fourth, I present an approach to analyze the effects of institutions and conflict on the behavior
of spillovers within states with mining activity. Lastly, I discuss identification issues that arise from this
method of analysis.
2.4.1 Baseline Specification
The first specification will aggregate all nine resources into one variable, abstracting from differences in
the types of resources. As in Berman et al. (2017), I take the price of the commodity that is most abundant
in the specific area.10 Therefore let,
yi,c,t = β1(Pt ∗M toti ) + FEi + FEct + i,t (2.1)
where yi,t is log sum of light in district i at time t, Pt is the price of the most prevalent commodity,
M toti is the number of resource producers contained within the district and Pt ∗ M toti is the interaction
effect between resource abundance and prices. FEct is a vector of country and year interaction dummies
along with their coefficients to control for country-time fixed effects, FEi is the unobserved heterogeneity
and i,c,t is the error term. I do not include Pt or M tot in equation 2.1 since these will be absorbed by the
country-year fixed effects FEct and district fixed effects FEi respectively. Applying first differences gives
yi,c,t − yi,t−1 ≡ ∆yit = β1(∆Pt ∗M toti ) + FEi + FEct + ∆i,t. (2.2)
I then include further price lags to equation 2 such that
∆yit =
T∑
l=0
βl(∆Pt−l ∗M toti ) + FEi + FEct + ∆i,t. (2.3)
To determine the amount of lags to keep in the specification, I assess where the statistical significance
10As a robustness, I also measure a weighted average price of all the resource commodities found in a particular district.
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falls off and I also use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz/Bayesian information criterion
(SBIC). Additionally, (∆Pt∗M toti ) can be split by production sizes of mines, such as small, medium or large
and also by ownership i.e. whether government or privately owned.11 Mines that have become exhausted
can also be added to the analysis to measure the impact that depleted resources have on resource-dependent
districts.12
An issue arises when adding in country-year fixed effects with the explanatory variables. This leads to a
high-dimensional matrix that needs to be inverted, which can be computationally difficult. As a solution, I
implement the algorithm of Guimaraes and Portugal (2010) that converges to the solution instead of invert-
ing a large matrix full of dummy variables. This method also allows me to control for district fixed effects
that may influence the growth rate of development.
2.4.2 Multiple Resource Specification
Disaggregating mineral types gives the benefit of knowing what resources have a greater effect on local
development than others, if any at all. This also alleviates any possible measurement error due to the
construction of the aggregate price created in section 4.1. Given the 9 mineral products denoted as s ∈ S, I
can rewrite equation 2 to be
∆yi,t =
S∑
s=1
βs1(∆P
s
t ∗M si ) + FEi + FEst + ∆i,t (2.4)
2.4.3 Institutional Effects
Institutions of a country may play an important role in determining the allocation of mineral wealth. For
instance, low rule of law and property rights or low regulatory quality may increase chances of hampering
or aiding development of the mining region compared to the rest of the country.
11I also include in the main regression analysis district-level fixed effects in order to control for district specific unobserved
heterogeneity that could affect the growth of districts.
12Furthermore, the growth of previous years may be strongly correlated with the growth in the current year. Therefore, I add to
equation 2.4 lagged light growth such that
∆yi,t = β1∆yi,t−1 +
T∑
l=1
βl(∆Pt−l ∗Mi) + FEi + FEct + ∆i,t
This leads to endogeneity problems since i,t−1 shows in both yi,t and yi,t−1 so that E[∆yi,t−1,∆i,t] 6= 0. To account for
this, I follow the suggestions of Arellano and Bond (1991) and use yit−2, yit−3, . . . as instruments.
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Therefore using equation 2.4 and adding in institutional interactions we have
∆yi,t =
S∑
s=1
βs1(∆P
s
t ∗M si ∗ Corri) +
S∑
s=1
βs1(∆P
s
t ∗M si ∗Ruli)
+
S∑
s=1
βs1(∆P
s
t ∗M si ∗BurQuali) + FEi + FEct + ∆i,t
(2.5)
Although bureaucratic quality, rule of law and level of corruption are the three main institutional charac-
teristics I focus on, I also consider military in politics, democratic accountability, government stability and
socioeconomic conditions.
2.4.4 Spillover Effects
To analyze potential spillover effects, I use two main methods. The first and most straightforward
method as done in Berman et al. (2017) is to classify districts that are adjacent to districts that have mines.
This has the benefit of providing a concise measurement for spillovers; however, it does not take into ac-
count potential spillovers from other mining districts in the state. The second method looks at spillovers
at a state level. This is done by summing all the mines within the state and interacting it with the price of
the resources most prevalently found among them. This will show, on average whether a district (regardless
of whether mines were located within its boundaries) benefited more or less from the fact that the state
itself had mining activity. Each of these methods have benefits in describing the spillover effects of mining
activity but take polar opposite views on the importance of distance from the resource areas themselves.13
Applying both methods will provide a more detailed picture on how resource endowment effects interact
with the state level economy.
13 A third method adds the number of resource areas together but discounts the resource area with respect to the distance between
the district of interest and the resource location such that
ResourceAccessi =
∑
j∈S
Resj
Distij
.
However, since there are nearly 47,000 district within my sample, this method would be computationally intensive for little
benefit. In the appendix C.2, I provide an example using Canada to compare the resource access spillover method with the statewide
spillover method.
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2.4.5 Benefits to Capitals Versus Mining Areas
An interesting further question is whether large cities and state capitals end up receiving a larger pro-
portion of the gains from resources than the actual surrounding area where the resources are located. This
is a concern to both local populations and national governments since many companies who have bought
the mineral rights and are in the business of extracting these resources are concentrated in the major cities.
Moreover, it may be the case that workers hired to extract resources in the region are brought in from more
populated areas and bring little additional development to the surrounding area. Similarly, if the state or
country has a highly concentrated form of government, one would expect a larger proportion of income to
be siphoned to the administrative capitals.
To look at the spatial distributional effects of resource wealth on state capitals and resource abundant
districts, I create an interaction term for each district for whether that district is a state capital (Cap1), how
much that state is abundant in resources when excluding their own resources (SRes) and the prices of those
resources (P ). Therefore
∆Yist = β1Cap1is × SRess ×∆Pt + β2Cap1is ×∆Pt + β3SRess ×∆Pt+ (2.6)
β4Resis ×∆Pt + FEi + FEst + ∆ist.
Where Cap1is × SRess × Pt is the 3-way interaction between a dummy for whether the district is a
state capital, the amount of resources in the state, and the change in prices of the most prevalent commodity
within the state. β1 can then be interpreted as the added spillover effect that capitals receive over non-capital
districts. I also include all relevant combinations of the interaction effect that would not be absorbed by
the state-year fixed effects. β2 is the effect on capitals from changes in commodity prices. For instance, if
we believe that higher resource commodity prices increase the cost of construction and the cost of inputs in
industries located within the state capital, we would expect that β2 would be negative. β3 is the coefficient
measuring the effect any district gets from the combined amount of resources in the state as prices for those
resources change, which one can think of as a type of spillover effect. β4 is the effect of resources due to
price changes in the district that produce resources. Next, I add in interaction effects of countrywide capitals
and large cities to equation 2.6 such that
40
∆Yist = β1Cap0is × SRess ×∆Pt + β2Cap0is ×∆Pt + β3SRess ×∆Pt+ (2.7)
β4Resis ×∆Pt + β5Cap1is × SRess ×∆Pt + β6Cap1is ×∆Pt+
β7SRess ×∆Pt + β8Resis ×∆Pt+
β9Cityis × SRess ×∆Pt + β10Cityis ×∆Pt + β11SRess ×∆Pt+
β12Resis ×∆Pt + FEi + FEct + ∆ist.
2.4.6 Institutional Effects on Spillovers
So far, this paper has provided a way to analyze institutional effects on mining locations in their own
districts. However, it does not address how one could analyze the institutional effects on the flow of mining
activity throughout the states? Adding a fourth interaction term to equation 2.7 would substantially compli-
cate the interpretation of our results. I instead provide a simple method to analyze the effects of institutions
on economic spillovers from mining activity. I first cluster countries together into four groups by their insti-
tutional characteristics by using k-mean clustering using Euclidean distances (Sumner and Vazquez (2014)).
I cluster over three institutional variables that could directly affect the economic impact of mining activity.
Bureaucratic quality was chosen to capture the ease of obtaining permits to increase mining activity when
prices change. To account for property rights of minerals and the mines themselves, I include an institutional
measure for rule of law. Finally, I include corruption due to the higher likelihood of mining revenue being
siphoned to alternative areas. I use 1992 values in order to mitigate the effects that mining activity can have
on institutions. I perform the k-mean clustering for several iterations, each time randomly choosing initial
starting points to ensure there are consistent groupings.
The k-means clustering provides four distinct groups. The first group can be characterized by having
average bureaucratic quality and corruption but low law and order (.73 standard deviations below the mean).
Group 2 clusters around OECD countries with high-quality institutional variables, all being more than one
standard deviation above the mean. Similarly, Group 3 can be classified as the weak institutions’ group
with all 3 measurements being lower than 1.07 standard deviations from the mean. Group 4 is the inverse
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of group 1 with high rule of law but low bureaucratic quality and corruption. For each group, I estimate
equation 2.7 separately to analyze the behavior of spillovers due to different institutional regimes.
I also perform the same analysis but looking at the effect that conflict has on the distributional flow of
mining activity. The variables of internal conflict, ethnic tension and external conflict were chosen to assist
in grouping countries by different conflict environments. I again perform the k-mean clustering to find four
distinct groups. Group 1 represents the highest stability of the groups, both internally and externally with
all values being more than .4 standard deviations above the mean. Group 2 has the most conflict with all
values being .98 standard deviations below the mean or lower. Group 3 is the external conflict group that has
relatively stable internal characteristics while group 4 is the opposite with .98 and .81 standard deviations
below the mean for internal conflict and ethnic tension respectively.
2.4.7 Identifying the Spatial Effects of Mines
A number of different identification issues arise when using mining location data and night-time lumi-
nosity satellite data to determine growth from resource abundance and I discuss how to address them below.
Direct Light Emissions from Mines
The first issue is that mining locations emit large amounts of light. Therefore, increased mining activity
will increase the total light in a district regardless of how mining activity affects the overall local economy.
To account for this, I use the spatial location of the mineral resources and create buffer regions around each
one. I then erase the light data that are contained within the buffered region, leaving presumably all other
economic activity in the region. I use various buffer distances for robustness: 4km, 6km and 10km. This
does create possibilities where these buffer areas erase light data other than mining activity such as towns
and cities. There is also still an issue that not all mines or resource areas are documented in the area. If
these are randomly distributed, the estimates would not be biased. However, if these unobserved mines are
strongly correlated to past and existing mines, then the effect of resource abundance will be biased upwards
since these unobserved mines will not be erased from the light data.
Effect of Countries on World Prices
A key assumption in identifying the effects of mining activity on economic growth is that no one district
or cluster of districts can affect global prices due to their increased economic growth. For robustness, I
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exclude countries that have a large share of global output and who experienced large growth over 1992 and
2013. The countries excluded are the United States and China in the narrowest set and India, China, Russia,
Brazil, the United States and the European Union for the broadest set.
Mines Turnover
Another potential concern could be that mines shut down and new ones emerge within the time period of
study. Accounting for this, I split the time periods into three groups. For 1992 to 1998, I use past producers
as the active mines. For 1999 to 2006, I use current producers and for 2006 to 2013, I use occurrences and
prospects. I also run the model specifications using all three groups for the entire sample.
Endogenous Institutions and Conflict
There is a possibility that increased mining revenues can affect the quality of certain country-level in-
stitutions. Particularly for conflict within a country, a large body of literature indicates that mining activity
can increase the likelihood of conflict over time. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) provide a survey that illustrates
the various channels in which resources can increase conflict within a country. In order to control for this
relationship, I use initial values for the institutional variables. This also has the added benefit of mitigating
the possibility that growth in development may affect institutions as well, leading to reverse causality issues.
Spatial and Temporal Correlation
Since both economic activity and mining tend to cluster spatially, I correct the standard errors using
a spatial heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) correction which allows for both cross-
sectional spatial correlation and location-specific serial correlation. This approach is similar to Berman et
al. (2017), who look at the spatial effects of mining activity on conflict within Africa.14 I assume that the
temporal decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel to be 5 years and a radius of 1000km for the spatial
kernel.
14For reference to the HAC correct method applied, see Conley(1999) and Hsiang, Meng and Cane(2011).
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2.5 Results
In this section, I first estimate the local effects that exogenous world prices have on mining districts.
Next, I show the distributional effects of mining locations on the overall state and determine the role of in-
stitutions. In section 6, I analyze in more depth the revenue sharing policies of three countries and estimate
their effects on development due to mining and world price increases.15
2.5.1 Local Effect of Mining Activity
Following the same structure as section 4, I begin with showing the results when aggregating all mineral
products together and using the price of the most prevalent mining activity within the district. Regressing
an interaction between the log difference in prices and a mining indicator on the log difference in total light
growth, as in Columns 1 through 3 in Table 2.2 shows a clear negative relationship when looking at the
immediate response to price increases. A one standard deviation increase of prices leads to 1.6 percentage
points less growth in light compared to non-mining districts. This amounts to an estimated .96 percentage
points slower growth rate for mining locations.16 I discuss four explanations for this result, which turns
out to be consistent through many specifications. First, increased development as measured by increased
luminosity of a district may lag behind any increased revenue created by immediate price increases. Sec-
ond, as described by Topp et al. (2008), capital investment and then subsequent increases in production
have historically lagged behind surges in prices. Downes et. al. (2014) and Gruen and Kennedy (2006) find
that lagged responses were greater before the 1970’s amounting to a 2-year overall lag but have, in more
recent times, reduced this lagged response. The third explanation could be due to the immediate effects of
increased mining activity being concentrated in the areas that are being censored.17 Lastly, the higher prices
in relevant resources that the district produces may funnel funds into increasing the production capacity of
the mining areas themselves instead of investing in projects that would emit light immediately or outside
of mining areas. Columns 2 and 3 provide lagged responses of price increases on mining locations and see
positive and significant effect on light growth for up to 5 years. Looking more specifically at those mines
that are owned by a government entity, we see larger immediate negative coefficient from price increases
and statistically insignificant effects on growth from lagged price increases on government mines.
15A majority of the results for this section can be found in the corresponding appendix.
16 Henderson et al. (2012) estimate the elasticity of light with respect to GPD to be .6.
17As a robustness I redo the analysis without censoring the luminosity data and find negative, yet insignificant coefficients.
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Table 2.2: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth
(1) (2) (3)
district mine > 0
x log diff in price -0.111∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(-6.84) (-6.63) (-8.29)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.147∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(9.26) (18.44)
x lag(2) log diff in price 0.205∗∗∗
(12.86)
x lag(3) log diff in price 0.0188
(1.18)
x lag(4) log diff in price 0.0340∗∗
(2.03)
x lag(5) log diff in price 0.343∗∗∗
(19.25)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes
N 939120 939120 751296
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mine being a dummy variable that takes a value of one if
a mine is located in the district . t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial
correlation. For interpretation of coefficients, one standard deviation of log differences in price is 0.13 with the elasticity of light with
respect to income being .6. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Appendix Table B.1 analyzes the local economic impact of mines based on a broad classification of
production sizes. This immediate negative effect to growth due to price increases can be seen to be driven
primarily from small mining operations, by far the most prevalent type of activity in the sample. The im-
mediate impact of large mines is positive yet insignificant. This may be due to larger mines being more
responsive to price increases or that some of the mining activity is not censored due to the size of the enter-
prise. Columns 2 through 4 show that the lagged effect of prices follows the same results as the combined
mines case with large increases in nighttime luminosity from lagged prices.
Next, I break down the estimation by resource type using prices for each resource instead of using the
price of the most prevalent resource. I find that different resource types have varying effects on the de-
velopment of mining districts. Appendix Table B.2 shows the price effect of various resource-abundant
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areas that include iron, copper and tin. Appendix Table B.3 breaks resources down into aluminum, coal
and zinc while Appendix Table B.4 shows the results for gold, silver, and nickel. As in the aggregate case,
mining districts see a negative effect from initial price increases. While most resource locations see pos-
itive effects in subsequent periods, copper, zinc and silver show evidence of more persistent negative effects.
For the initial analysis of the effects of institutions on mining and economic activity, Appendix Table
B.5 reports the estimated coefficients specified by equation 2.5. Not surprisingly, lower corruption and
rule of law both mitigate the immediate slower growth that mining locations witness and provide higher
growth in subsequent periods from an initial price increase. Furthermore, column 4 shows that higher ex-
ternal conflict increases the immediacy that mining districts respond to positive prices. This could be due to
countries who are involved in more external conflicts perceiving mining locations as strategically as well as
economically important. Additionally, higher bureaucratic quality shows negative coefficients for both the
immediate effect and for subsequent periods due to world price increases. One explanation may be due to
the effectiveness of the country to impose additional regulations or taxes on mining locations reducing the
effectiveness of mining locations.
2.5.2 Distributional Effects of Mining Activity
Looking at spillover effects, Appendix Table B.6 shows that districts who were adjacent to mining areas
see a statistically significant decrease initially but an increase one year after a price increase of the major
commodity in the area. This effect is similar to the one found for the mining districts themselves, giving
evidence that these adjacent districts are reliant on the mining activity around them. Columns 3 and 4 extend
the analysis to estimating the effects that mines have on either a national/sub-national capital or a large city
when a mine is present within their own district. We see that the effects of mining activity on these districts
do not provide any significant effects.
In order to obtain a complete picture of the distributional effects of mining activity, Table 2.3 estimates
the specification described in equation 2.7. I find that there is strong co-movement between large cities and
mining districts within the state such that there is a delayed response from the initial price increase, where
the city performs below average and then grows faster than the average large city in subsequent periods.
This again suggests that large cities are tied to the mining activities within the state. In the full sample, I do
not find evidence of national and sub-national capitals benefiting from increased mining revenue.
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Table 2.3: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: State wide spillover effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
district mine > 0
x log diff in price -0.107∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-5.87) (-5.85) (-5.87)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.147∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(9.26) (8.91) (8.98) (7.59)
# of state mines
x log diff in price -0.0000506 0.0000145 0.0000122
(-0.87) (0.24) (0.20)
x lag(1) log diff in price -0.0000352 -0.0000360 -0.000101∗
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-1.74)
x log diff in price x country capital 0.0233 0.0219
(0.40) (0.38)
x log diff in price x state capital -0.0183 -0.0164
(-1.15) (-1.01)
x log diff in price x large city -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗
(-5.74) (-5.23)
x lag(1) log diff in price x country capital -0.0226
(-0.42)
x lag(1) log diff in price x state capital 0.0190
(1.26)
x lag(1) log diff in price x large city 0.0243∗∗∗
(4.60)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 939120 938980 938980 938980
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
2.5.3 The Role of Institutions
Institutional characteristics such as corruption may affect a country’s allocation of increased mining rev-
enues. Table 2.4 provides estimates of statewide spillover effects on four different clusterings of countries
based on their initial indicators of levels of bureaucratic quality, corruption and rule of law.18 Cluster 1,
represented by low law and order but average bureaucratic quality and corruption see moderate, yet still
significant local effects on the mining districts. The strong institution group, cluster 2, also has lower local
18See Appendix Tables B.7 and B.8 for the descriptive statistics and country lists for each cluster.
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effects of mining within their own district. However, districts that are within a state with prevalent mining
activity receive a positive and statistically significant increase to their growth when strong institutions are
present, regardless if they contain a large city. This may suggest that countries with strong bureaucratic qual-
ity, rule of law and low corruption are more likely to have systems or economies that disperse the benefits of
mining activities. Cluster 3, which can be characterized as the weak institution cluster, loses the local effects
of mining activity immediately with no statistically significant effect of any lagged prices interacted with
mining activity. Furthermore, it is the only group that provides statistically significant evidence of the state
capital benefiting from increased mining activity within the state. In order to interpret the significance of
this coefficient, I calculate that a one standard deviation in increased prices results in a 4.1 percentage point
increase in the growth in lights on average for districts that include the state capitals or a 2.46 percentage
point increase in income. Cluster 4 which represents the high rule of law but low indexes on bureaucratic
quality and corruption sees the highest magnitude for the local effects of mining activity. Unlike the overall
estimation, countries that belong in cluster 4 see their cities who are in mining states grow more slowly than
other districts. Comparing clusters 1, 2 and 4 together suggests that rule of law is the leading driver to higher
impacts of increased mining activity locally.
2.5.4 The Role of Conflict
Different types of conflict may have varying effects on the distributional characteristics of mining activ-
ity. This is particularly true of external conflicts which early in the paper have shown to actually increase
the developmental impact of mining locations. Table 2.5 shows the estimates of the specification described
by equation 2.7 but grouped by four different conflict groups.19 Starting with cluster 1, which is represented
by countries with low levels of each type of conflict, we see that this group behaves almost identically to
the high institutional quality group in the last section. Further similarities are not seen when observing the
overall high conflict group, cluster 2, with the overall low institution group when looking at the local ef-
fects of commodity prices on the growth of mining locations. However, cluster 2 does see the state capitals
receiving a persistent increase in growth when mining locations are prevalent, similar to that of the weak
institution country group. Furthermore, cluster 2 does not see any increased growth in large cities that are
not the state capital which is seen in other groups.
19See Appendix Tables B.9 and B.10 for the descriptive statistics and country lists for each cluster.
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Table 2.4: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Institution groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
district mine > 0
x log diff in price -0.0673∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗
(-3.06) (-2.74) (-2.11) (-3.61)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.100∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.152 0.305∗∗∗
(5.43) (4.96) (1.36) (3.79)
# of state mines
x log diff in price -0.0000418 0.000769 0.00412 -0.00155∗
(-1.02) (1.30) (1.26) (-1.71)
x lag(1) log diff in price -0.0000241 0.00157∗∗∗ -0.00443 0.000505
(-0.60) (2.78) (-1.37) (0.60)
x log diff in price x country capital -0.00299 0.0714 -0.0214 0.0184
(-0.06) (0.10) (-0.03) (0.07)
x lag(1) log diff in price x country capital -0.0129 0.132 -0.0964 -0.0395
(-0.26) (0.16) (-0.19) (-0.23)
x log diff in price x state capital 0.00119 -0.0269 -0.0900 -0.00463
(0.07) (-1.04) (-1.30) (-0.07)
x lag(1) log diff in price x state capital -0.00363 0.0261 0.111∗ -0.0281
(-0.25) (1.07) (1.77) (-0.43)
x log diff in price x large city -0.0232∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0403 0.0356
(-4.57) (-4.44) (-0.77) (0.81)
x lag(1) log diff in price x large city 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗ 0.0193 -0.0914∗∗
(2.93) (6.49) (0.45) (-2.36)
Institution Cluster Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 222640 327140 125980 102600
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Cluster 1 is
represented by low rule of law with average corruption and bureaucracy. Cluster 2 has strong institutions while cluster 3
has weak institutions. Cluster 4 is represented by high corruption, low bureaucracy but high rule of law.
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Next, for cluster 3 that is represented by high external conflict and lower levels of ethnic tension and
internal conflict, we see the exact same statistically significant effects found in the overall sample although
with weaker magnitudes. Cluster 4, which is characterized by low external conflict but high internal conflict
and ethnic tension, shows that districts that are within mining states actually receive a negative effect from
increases in prices. In the initial period these districts show a positive growth compared to districts in other
states when prices increase. However, in the subsequent periods these districts see a dampening of their
growth due to the initial price increase. This could be due to internal conflicts rising up within those states
for control of the overall mining activities.
2.6 Differences in Revenue Sharing Policies
Many countries have enacted revenue sharing arrangements to address a variety of different concerns.
Bauer et. al. (2016) describe these as: the attempt to recognize local claims on resources, a measure to
counteract any negative impacts that resource extraction may provide, promoting development in resource-
abundant regions and reducing the likelihood of violent conflict. However, resource sharing policies vary
widely between countries. In this section I look at three specific countries, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, who
have largely different revenue sharing policies to evaluate their effectiveness using the methods in this paper.
Starting with the least involved in their revenue sharing arrangements, Chile does not treat revenue from
mineral extraction differently from other non-resource revenues and does not add additional taxes to mining
activities. Chile’s form of government, unlike the federal form of Argentina and Brazil, is Unitary. This
means all revenues get directed to a central entity and distributed through them. Argentina, on the other
hand, has the largest royalties imposed on mining activities and, unlike Chile, are collected directly by the
subnational instead of national government. Indeed, it has been codified in the Argentinian constitution that
local populations have a right to a share of resource revenues. Brazil also enacts additional royalties and
are collected by the national government. They then enact a ‘derivation based’ intergovernmental transfer
program to redirect the funds back to the original or adjacent areas.
Table 2.6 compares these countries by estimating the model specification in equation 2.7 in order to see
the local and spillover effects of mining locations. Column 1 shows the results when looking specifically at
Chilean districts which shows that districts with mining activity see a positive increase in the year after the
initial price increase. However, unlike the other countries in this comparison, and with the entire sample, the
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Table 2.5: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Conflict groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
district mine > 0
x log diff in price -0.0759∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.0547 -0.178∗∗∗
(-1.73) (-2.84) (-1.61) (-3.99)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.156∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.0873∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(4.52) (3.17) (3.01) (3.98)
# of state mines
x log diff in price -0.000307 -0.00456∗∗∗ -0.0000459 0.00171∗∗∗
(-0.55) (-3.73) (-0.78) (3.30)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.00125∗∗ 0.00244∗∗ -0.00000387 -0.00157∗∗∗
(2.32) (2.16) (-0.07) (-3.15)
x log diff in price x country capital 0.00306 0.0104 0.00211 -0.0581
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.39)
x lag(1) log diff in price x country capital 0.0132 -0.00202 -0.0375 0.0261
(0.16) (-0.00) (-0.24) (0.20)
x log diff in price x state capital -0.0207 -0.0428 -0.00964 -0.0253
(-0.67) (-0.60) (-0.41) (-0.78)
x lag(1) log diff in price x state capital 0.0269 0.171∗∗ -0.00158 0.00392
(0.93) (2.49) (-0.07) (0.13)
x log diff in price x large city -0.0352∗∗∗ -0.0662 -0.0199∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
(-3.27) (-1.63) (-2.37) (-2.63)
x lag(1) log diff in price x large city 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.00240 0.0135∗ 0.0409∗∗∗
(3.22) (0.06) (1.83) (3.99)
Conflict Cluster Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 270940 45600 200180 295680
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Cluster 1
is represented by low internal and external conflict. Cluster 2 has high internal and external conflict. Cluster 3 has low
internal conflict and high external conflict and cluster 4 has high internal conflict and low external conflict.
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Table 2.6: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Revenue sharing policy
analysis
(1) (2) (3)
district mine > 0
x log diff in price -0.249 -0.125∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(-1.50) (-1.73) (-3.99)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.231∗∗∗ 0.324 0.340∗∗∗
(4.88) (1.21) (10.27)
x lag(2) log diff in price -0.0202 -0.147 0.0695∗
(-0.15) (-1.18) (1.77)
x lag(3) log diff in price -0.131∗∗ 0.0111 0.110∗∗
(-2.23) (0.14) (2.35)
# of state mines
x log diff in price 0.000519 0.00610 0.00168
(0.37) (0.87) (0.25)
x lag(1) log diff in price 0.000106 -0.00959 -0.000975
(0.07) (-1.35) (-0.15)
x log diff in price x state capital -0.0269 -0.0244 0.00373
(-0.68) (-0.50) (0.46)
x log diff in price x large city -0.0371 -0.00404 -0.0116∗
(-0.84) (-0.75) (-1.68)
x lag(1) log diff in price x state capital 0.1230∗∗ 0.0559 0.00859
(1.97) (1.05) (0.93)
x lag(1) log diff in price x large city 0.0170 0.100 0.0931∗∗
(0.45) (1.29) (2.03)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Chile Argentina Brazil
N 918 9036 99072
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mine being a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if a mine is located in the district . t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation within a 1000km
radius and a 20 year serial correlation. For interpretation of coefficients, one standard deviation of log differences in price
is 0.13 with the elasticity of light with respect to income being .6. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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increased growth stops and reverses direction by the third year. In relation to this, we do see state capitals of
these mining areas receiving positive and statistically significant growth compared to other districts in the
country. Column 2 reports Argentina’s results which shows there is no statistically significant result of the
local effects of mining areas due to price changes. Column 3 shows that Brazilian mining districts see the
largest growth over the longest time period. Furthermore, cities within resource-abundant states also see a
statistically significant increase in their light growth due to increases in last year’s world prices.
2.7 Conclusion
Although the resource curse has been studied thoroughly at an international level, local effects of re-
source activity are much less understood. This paper shows how the effects of mining activity can benefit or
hinder certain locations in a country and can vary a great amount depending on certain country characteris-
tics such as institutions, the degree of conflict and revenue sharing policies. Overall, I find that districts and
cities within the same state as mining districts respond similarly to exogenous price shocks and that, over
the long run, the region benefits from the increases in commodity prices. However, low quality institutions
and internal strife can change the distributional impact of mining activities. Unfortunately, the availability
for the night time luminosity data is only until 2013, coinciding with the downturn of commodities prices.
Looking at other remote sensing data such as the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) which
is monthly data, higher resolution and spanning from 2012 to 2018 would further increase our understand-
ings of the boom and bust super cycle of resource commodities. Reducing the sample of countries to those
that have district-level population data would further help quantify the effects mining activity has on devel-
opment. This paper’s findings are important for national and regional planners who need to determine the
institutional environment in order to benefit from resources. Its findings also determine how the state, and
more specifically which parts of the state, are dependent on mining activity.
53
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1: WHY DON’T AFRICAN COUNTRIES TRADE MORE WITH
EACH OTHER? THE ROLE OF BORDER CROSSINGS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Section A.1 of this appendix includes additional tables and figures. Section A.2 presents model details.
Section A.3 discusses technical aspects of the identification and calibration techniques.
A.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for bilateral trade flows
In Billion USD 2008 2014 Percent Change
Overall Trade
Agriculture 14.2 21.2 49.3
Manufacturing 26.1 36.3 39.08
Resources 138 153 10.8
Total 180 239 32.78
Internal Trade
Agriculture 3.17 7.34 132
Manufacturing 8.85 17.9 102.25
Resources 11.7 17.1 46.1
Total 23.8 42.4 78.1
Foreign Trade
Agriculture 11.03 14.7 33.6
Manufacturing 17.2 18.5 7.56
Resources 126 136 7.94
Total 157 197 25.48
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Table A.2: Proportion of trade for 2008 and 2014 by sector
2008 2014
Sector Total Total African Non- Total Total African Non-
Name Exports Imports Imports Adjacent Exports Imports Imports Adjacent
Imports Imports
AnimalProd 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Chemicals 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.10
FoodStuffs 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05
Footwear 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Hides 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Machinery 0.04 0.24 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.21 0.13 0.16
Metals 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.15
MineralProd 0.46 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.28
Misc 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
Plastics 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05
Stone/Glass 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.01
Textiles 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01
Transport 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.07
VegProd 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
WoodProd 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
Other 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.00
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: UNCOMTRADE.dta
Table A.3: Dependent Variable: log difference in border wait time
(1)
Average Time of Non Controlled Borders -0.0195
(-0.03)
N 268
R2 0.294
The dependent variable is growth in aggregate imports from 2008 to 2014. Regressions are controlled for importer-year-
sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, ***
0.01.
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Table A.4: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Including rest of world trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.191∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ -0.160∗ -0.225∗∗ -0.290∗∗
(-1.97) (-3.44) (-6.16) (-1.86) (-2.50) (-2.38)
Change in Drive Times 0.00179∗∗∗ 0.00165∗∗∗ 0.000737∗∗∗ 0.000777∗∗∗
(12.49) (10.78) (5.06) (5.15)
Change in Port Costs 4.605∗∗∗ 3.104∗∗∗ -1.604∗ -1.167
(5.25) (3.36) (-1.72) (-1.22)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.533∗∗∗ 0.00351
(4.69) (0.03)
Change in Tariffs 0.399∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(9.11) (11.11)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent
N 4710 4035 4005 3855 3180 3165
R2 0.209 0.254 0.275 0.257 0.288 0.321
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.5: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument
sectors 1-5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -1.254∗ -0.824 -0.938 -1.321 -0.679
(-1.94) (-1.01) (-1.12) (-1.53) (-0.80)
Change in Drive Times 0.00203∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00128 0.00109 0.00110
(2.89) (2.85) (1.41) (1.16) (1.20)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.854∗ 1.490∗∗ 3.292∗∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗
(1.71) (2.37) (5.10) (2.74) (2.97)
Number of Documents 1.875∗∗ 1.888∗ 3.917∗∗∗ 0.124 0.365
(2.16) (1.72) (3.48) (0.11) (0.32)
N 227 227 227 227 227
R2 0.238 0.265 0.338 0.172 0.239
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Column 1 Animal and Animal Product, Column 2 Vegetable Products, Column 3
Foodstuffs, Column 4 Mineral Products, Column 5 Chemicals and Allied Products.
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Table A.6: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument
sectors 6-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.794∗ -0.448 -0.777∗ -0.952∗∗ -0.545
(-1.78) (-1.30) (-1.70) (-2.08) (-1.59)
Change in Drive Times 0.00206∗∗∗ 0.00102∗ 0.00211∗∗∗ 0.00237∗∗∗ 0.000792
(2.65) (1.70) (2.66) (2.97) (1.33)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.874∗ 0.528 0.933∗∗ 0.588 0.298
(1.92) (1.51) (2.00) (1.26) (0.85)
Number of Documents 1.081 -0.311 3.146∗∗∗ 2.575∗∗∗ -0.355
(1.16) (-0.43) (3.31) (2.69) (-0.50)
N 222 222 222 222 222
R2 0.275 0.245 0.303 0.317 0.293
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Column 1 Plastics and Rubber, Column 2 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather and Furs,
Column 3 Wood and Wood Products, Column 4 Textiles, Column 5 Footwear and Headgear.
Table A.7: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument
sectors 11-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.920∗∗ -0.797 -1.016∗∗ -0.822∗ -0.727∗
(-2.17) (-1.59) (-2.15) (-1.80) (-1.70)
Change in Drive Times 0.00154∗∗ 0.00225∗∗∗ 0.00128 0.00153∗ 0.00209∗∗∗
(2.10) (2.59) (1.56) (1.92) (2.82)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.548 0.450 0.773 0.506 0.579
(1.27) (0.88) (1.60) (1.08) (1.33)
Number of Documents 1.762∗∗ 1.785∗ 2.321∗∗ 0.512 2.153∗∗
(1.99) (1.71) (2.35) (0.54) (2.42)
N 222 222 222 222 222
R2 0.276 0.271 0.261 0.257 0.242
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Column 1 Stone and Glass Column 2 Metals, Column 3 Machinery and Electrical,
Column 4 Transportation, Column 5 Miscellaneous
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Table A.8: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 3 sector case: exogenous border instrument
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -1.231∗∗∗ -0.812∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗
(-4.29) (-4.74) (-3.82)
Change in Drive Times 0.00234∗∗∗ 0.00172∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗
(4.70) (5.77) (4.84)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 1.224∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(4.18) (3.53) (3.16)
Number of Documents 3.938∗∗∗ 1.983∗∗ 1.699∗
(3.96) (2.22) (1.85)
Sectors Ag Manf Res
N 666 1554 1110
R2 0.270 0.265 0.242
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.9: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument,
aggregated transportation costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Costs Change (Upper Bound) -0.561∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -1.137∗ -1.107∗∗
(-3.33) (-3.84) (-3.78) (-1.95) (-2.02)
AboveAvgDistInteraction 0.355∗∗ -0.0411
(2.46) (-0.24)
AboveAveTimeInteraction 0.386∗∗∗ -0.0291
(2.66) (-0.16)
IV Regress No No No Yes Yes
N 3600 3600 3600 2355 2355
R2 0.246 0.248 0.248 0.301 0.302
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.10: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument,
aggregated transportation costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Costs Change (Lower Bound) -0.591∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -1.115∗ -1.083∗∗
(-3.51) (-4.04) (-3.95) (-1.95) (-2.03)
AboveAvgDistInteraction 0.365∗∗ -0.0468
(2.53) (-0.27)
AboveAvgTimeInteraction 0.389∗∗∗ -0.0348
(2.68) (-0.19)
IV Regress No No No Yes Yes
N 3600 3600 3600 2355 2355
R2 0.246 0.248 0.248 0.303 0.303
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.11: Estimation results : Time of Trucking on Cost of Trucking
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
TimeToPort(hrs) 27.378∗∗
(13.005)
Intercept 333.321∗∗∗
(185.324)
N 16
R2 0.24
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Table A.12: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument,
aggregated transportation costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Cost Change -0.262∗ -0.386∗∗ -0.385∗∗ -1.167∗∗ -1.160∗∗
(-1.78) (-2.40) (-2.45) (-1.97) (-2.04)
AboveAvgDistInteraction 0.258∗ -0.0242
(1.91) (-0.15)
AboveAvgTimeInteraction 0.302∗∗ -0.0250
(2.22) (-0.15)
IV Regress No No No Yes Yes
N 5038 5038 5038 2689 2689
R2 0.206 0.207 0.207 0.300 0.301
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.13: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Constant Routes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.0866 -0.205 -0.343∗ -0.0447 -0.0342 -0.0773
(-0.47) (-1.09) (-1.84) (-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.39)
Change in Drive Times 0.00219∗∗∗ 0.00199∗∗∗ 0.000152 0.000236
(10.76) (8.98) (0.57) (0.85)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.282∗∗∗ -0.0284
(2.58) (-0.28)
Change in Tariffs 0.448∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(8.53) (10.67)
Number of Documents -0.365 -0.370
(-1.10) (-1.20)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent
N 3405 3330 3330 2520 2490 2490
R2 0.213 0.245 0.265 0.276 0.276 0.314
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.14: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sector case: exogenous border instrument,
aggregated transportation costs with constant routes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Cost Change -0.984∗∗∗ -3.428∗∗∗ 0.402 -81.68 -127.9
(-6.46) (-4.82) (1.19) (-1.40) (-1.36)
AboveAvgDistInteraction 2.510∗∗∗ 124.8
(3.52) (1.35)
AboveAvgTimeInteraction -1.586∗∗∗ 79.54
(-4.60) (1.39)
IV Regress No No No Yes Yes
N 5113 5113 5113 2689 2689
R2 0.211 0.213 0.215 0.292 0.258
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.15: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Symmetric Border crossings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.342∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -1.075∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗
(-3.14) (-4.80) (-7.54) (-2.81) (-3.53) (-4.70)
Change in Drive Times 0.00216∗∗∗ 0.00178∗∗∗ 0.000582∗∗ 0.000503∗
(10.00) (8.01) (2.02) (1.79)
Change in Port Costs 5.495∗∗∗ 4.431∗∗∗ -0.662 -0.576
(4.60) (3.68) (-0.47) (-0.41)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.783∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(5.87) (3.10)
Change in Tariffs 0.462∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
(8.92) (10.54)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent Adjacent only
N 4230 3330 3330 3390 2490 2490
R2 0.215 0.258 0.286 0.261 0.280 0.322
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.16: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Imports with no supplementation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) 0.146 -0.0180 -0.172 0.152 -0.0408 -0.296∗∗
(1.47) (-0.18) (-1.39) (1.60) (-0.45) (-2.29)
Change in Drive Times 0.00125∗∗∗ 0.000840∗∗∗ 0.00157∗∗∗ 0.00124∗∗∗
(6.88) (3.90) (6.83) (4.58)
Change in Port Costs 7.424∗∗∗ 6.840∗∗∗ 4.499∗∗∗ 4.097∗∗∗
(6.67) (6.01) (3.41) (3.06)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.329∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(2.59) (3.11)
Change in Tariffs -0.185∗∗∗ 0.0353
(-3.70) (0.73)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent
N 4410 3360 3330 3555 2505 2490
R2 0.423 0.384 0.384 0.457 0.366 0.370
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.17: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Exports with no supplementation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.625∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.0414
(-6.59) (-7.90) (-7.78) (-2.23) (-2.06) (-0.37)
Change in Drive Times 0.000941∗∗∗ 0.00116∗∗∗ -0.000324 -0.0000297
(5.27) (5.47) (-1.60) (-0.13)
Change in Port Costs 9.600∗∗∗ 8.934∗∗∗ 0.863 1.516
(8.78) (7.99) (0.74) (1.29)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.176 -0.245∗∗
(1.41) (-2.11)
Change in Tariffs 0.117∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(2.39) (5.00)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Both Non adjacent Non adjacent Non adjacent
N 4410 3360 3330 3555 2505 2490
R2 0.448 0.489 0.493 0.492 0.538 0.545
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.18: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: PPML estimation with imports and export
with no supplementing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Border Wait Time (log) -0.221∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.0957∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(-16.26) (-8.96) (-10.49) (-16.62) (-17.25) (-10.14) (-13.59) (-15.97)
Tariffs (log) -0.257∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.00671 -0.0549∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-22.88) (-11.23) (-11.92) (-23.01) (-14.14) (-0.74) (-6.38) (-13.28)
Border-Road Time Interaction -0.166∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(-20.48) (-27.26)
Border-Distance Interaction -0.154∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(-17.71) (-25.92)
Port Costs (log) -0.00164 -0.185
(-0.01) (-1.27)
Trade Flow Import Import Import Import Exports Exports Exports Exports
N 6648 6648 6648 5878 7465 7465 7465 6570
R2 0.753 0.772 0.767 0.748 0.695 0.732 0.726 0.693
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.19: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sectors case with 3 year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Travel Costs -0.537∗∗∗ -1.357∗∗∗ -0.118 -0.110 -1.056 0.124
(-2.90) (-4.62) (-0.64) (-0.25) (-0.28) (0.28)
Change in Tariffs 0.443∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(18.35) (7.33) (17.24)
Adjacency/Non Adjacency Both Both Non adjacen Both Both Non adjacent
Rest of World Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 6540 3765 5505 6313 3550 2335
R2 0.163 0.210 0.194 0.759 0.920 0.745
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. All variables are
calculated by a 3 year average. Regressions are controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects.
t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.20: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes 15 sectors case with institution interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Travel Costs -0.687∗∗∗ -0.500 -0.663∗∗∗ -0.479 -0.649∗∗∗ -0.495 -0.627∗∗∗ -0.453
(-4.90) (-1.58) (-4.75) (-1.54) (-4.67) (-1.60) (-4.44) (-1.48)
Change in Tariffs 0.400∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(30.14) (22.64) (30.13) (22.64) (30.05) (22.63) (30.16) (22.70)
Regulatory Qual. Int. -0.334∗∗ -0.136
(-1.98) (-0.69)
Rule of Law Int. -0.146 -0.0970
(-1.10) (-0.63)
Political Corruption Int. -0.302∗∗ -0.194
(-2.08) (-1.16)
Political Stability Int. -0.161 -0.290∗
(-1.01) (-1.71)
FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493
R2 0.393 0.670 0.392 0.670 0.393 0.670 0.392 0.670
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. All variables are
calculated by a 3 year average. Regressions are controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects.
t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.21: GE multiple sector results
Type α β θs µs StdEr R2
Own Calibration Ag -23 -1.4 -7.3449 -0.1402 0.0417 0.0476
Own Calibration Manf -23 -1.4 -3.9976 -0.2667 0.0449 0.1768
Own Calibration Res -23 -1.4 6.8117 -0.1105 0.0288 0.0366
Own Calibration Ag -30.2 -27.9 -1.1590 -4.1426 2.5541 0.0165
Own Calibration Manf -30.2 -27.9 -1.1919 -5.8859 2.4824 0.0076
Own Calibration Res -30.2 -27.9 2.0076 -0.2684 2.2579 .0464
EK Ag -3.85 -3.04 -1.808 -2.8593 0.9756 0.0359
EK Manf -3.85 -3.04 -1.0059 -5.2331 0.6652 0.0017
EK Res -3.85 -3.04 0.5430 -1.2440 1.7650 0.0045
AL Ag -0.67 -0.33 2.7966 -2.5527 2.1621 0.0024
AL Manf -0.67 -0.33 0.023 -4.7521 2.3939 0.0012
AL Res -0.67 -0.33 0.0221 -0.1033 1.6385 0.0031
Coeff represents the estimated coefficient of the general equilibrium estimation. AATCalib represents the alpha and beta
values calibrated from Allen et al (2014), EK are values found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and AL are values found in
Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
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Table A.22: Percentage point change in trade patterns with no improvements. Universal gravity model
approach
Country Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola -22.00 -13.75 -14.80
Botswana -22.39 -28.93 -36.74
Burundi -34.82 -28.92 -31.80
Congo; Dem. Rep. -33.40 -32.42 -34.88
Kenya -17.05 -11.88 -8.40
Lesotho -3.76 -23.56 -16.15
Malawi -22.49 -15.00 -13.37
Mozambique -33.03 -38.21 -37.10
Namibia 6.53 5.36 2.20
Rwanda -5.81 -10.65 -10.68
South Africa -7.60 -11.60 -0.97
Swaziland -11.68 -12.88 -16.13
Tanzania -12.86 -1.86 -7.94
Uganda -4.66 -7.64 -13.98
Zambia -6.52 0.96 -11.83
Zimbabwe -0.88 6.95 -4.17
Weighted Avg -12.85 -12.10 -8.67
Table A.23: Percentage point change in trade patterns with 3 hour borders. Universal gravity model approach
Country Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola 16.53 6.40 12.94
Botswana 6.24 1.915 3.87
Burundi 7.09 2.99 8.50
Congo; Dem. Rep. 18.75 8.58 20.10
Kenya 16.36 9.19 12.32
Lesotho 2.34 0.397 2.42
Malawi 8.48 1.38 6.27
Mozambique 11.28 3.72 7.03
Namibia 8.28 3.39 10.22
Rwanda 6.11 3.38 5.73
South Africa 12.12 4.36 13.44
Swaziland 10.63 0.84 2.58
Tanzania 12.91 5.94 10.56
Uganda 14.68 7.22 9.81
Zambia 15.62 5.27 12.24
Zimbabwe 10.88 4.17 9.40
Mean 11.14 4.322 9.21
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Table A.24: Percentage point change in trade patterns with 3 hour borders: for internal and foreign trade.
Universal gravity model approach
Country Inter-trade Inter-trade Inter-trade Foreign trade Foreign trade Foreign trade
Agriculture Manufacturing Resources Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola 21.03 57.83 13.61 0.17 -1.93 -1.33
Botswana 8.23 25.69 6.95 -0.12 -3.22 -1.11
Burundi 9.61 22.02 11.13 1.297 5.76 -0.97
Congo; Dem. Rep. 27.63 79.34 29.35 0.59 1.32 -0.99
Kenya 19.97 69.55 13.45 -0.28 -3.37 -0.94
Lesotho 2.95 13.00 3.073 -0.51 -8.36 -1.296
Malawi 10.38 10.48 6.718 0.59 2.01 -0.797
Mozambique 16.99 42.59 9.55 0.019 -2.05 -1.02
Namibia 7.97 31.02 11.76 -0.195 -3.044 -0.86
Rwanda 6.02 21.73 5.08 0.48 1.32 -0.44
South Africa 13.57 34.64 14.29 -0.45 -4.03 -0.85
Swaziland 11.895 6.65 2.29 0.14 -0.97 -0.97
Tanzania 14.94 51.55 12.97 -0.10 -2.14 -0.899
Uganda 15.20 55.95 11.46 0.18 -0.457 -0.58
Zambia 15.49 41.56 13.54 1.25 8.04 0.24
Zimbabwe 10.59 29.86 8.19 0.396 1.29 -0.46
Mean 13.28 37.092 10.84 0.22 -0.62 -0.83
Table A.25: Percentage point change in trade patterns with China ports. Fixed effects estimation approach
Partner Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola 0.62 2.74 1.62
Asia 3.88 17.06 10.08
Botswana 1.12 4.897 2.89
Burundi 0.98 4.32 2.16
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.85 4.43 2.62
Kenya 0.744 3.27 1.93
Lesotho 0.322 2.03 1.035
Malawi 0.783 3.44 2.03
Mozambique 0.11 0.48 0.28
Namibia 0.15 0.64 0.38
Rwanda 0.63 2.78 1.64
South Africa 0.52 2.29 1.35
Swaziland 0.599 2.63 1.55
Tanzania 0.14 0.598 0.353
Uganda 0.92 4.06 2.40
Zambia 1.34 5.90 3.49
Zimbabwe 1.14 5.02 2.97
Total 1.28 5.71 3.34
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Table A.26: Percentage point change in trade patterns with modern ports. Universal gravity model approach
Country Agriculture Manufacturing Resources
Angola 10.549 14.381 2.830
Botswana 0.858 10.916 21.063
Burundi 8.061 23.118 4.311
Congo; Dem. Rep. 7.233 12.602 1.829
Kenya 4.209 8.493 2.538
Lesotho -0.013 -0.043 -0.054
Malawi 2.233 12.300 2.107
Mozambique 1.888 -0.809 -0.937
Namibia 0.111 -3.305 -1.773
Rwanda 3.811 8.096 1.107
South Africa 3.584 6.610 2.208
Swaziland 0.730 3.807 0.909
Tanzania 2.451 -1.124 0.640
Uganda 8.468 19.438 5.180
Zambia 5.981 129.935 10.625
Zimbabwe 3.365 16.609 8.631
Mean 2.854 6.036 1.952
Table A.27: Percentage point change in trade patterns with modern ports: for internal and foreign trade.
Universal gravity model approach
Country Intertrade Agriculture Intertrade Manufacturing Intertrade Resources Foreign trade Agriculture Foreign trade Manufacturing Foreign trade Resources
Angola 0.022 0.081 0.006 11.136 15.131 3.096
Botswana 0.091 0.625 0.201 0.948 12.581 25.007
Burundi -0.032 0.028 -0.016 13.699 39.165 2.342
Congo; Dem. Rep. 0.029 0.063 -0.061 11.981 20.863 2.645
Kenya -0.051 -0.019 -0.018 5.845 11.712 0.643
Lesotho -0.110 -0.072 -0.107 0.088 0.000 -0.016
Malawi -0.094 -0.084 -0.126 3.131 16.813 2.011
Mozambique -0.014 -0.007 -0.021 1.734 -0.730 -1.063
Namibia -0.030 -0.024 -0.287 0.104 -2.184 -0.873
Rwanda -0.032 0.025 0.025 6.170 13.011 0.504
South Africa -0.018 -0.024 -0.376 2.463 4.534 1.336
Swaziland -0.065 -0.091 -0.094 0.850 4.181 1.039
Tanzania -0.016 0.044 -0.001 2.993 -1.409 -0.127
Uganda -0.032 0.006 -0.004 8.075 18.456 0.892
Zambia -0.019 0.019 -1.282 6.743 146.061 8.951
Zimbabwe -0.077 -0.078 -0.131 3.205 15.519 7.973
Mean 0.050 0.090 0.256 3.506 7.602 0.621
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Figure A.1: Estimating the multi-sector gravity constants
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Table A.28: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes: Exogenous border instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in Border Wait Times (log) -0.332∗∗ -0.442∗ -0.457∗ -0.457∗
(-2.12) (-1.87) (-1.95) (-1.95)
Change in Drive Times 0.00206∗∗ 0.00193∗∗ 0.00186∗ 0.00186∗
(2.25) (2.03) (1.96) (1.96)
AboveAvgDist Interaction 0.224 0.231 0.231
(1.02) (1.05) (1.05)
Change in Tariffs 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(3.06) (3.06)
Number of Documents 1.062
(1.19)
N 1246 1246 1246 1246
R2 0.446 0.446 0.450 0.450
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. Regressions are
controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects. t values reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.29: Growth of trade flows from infrastructure changes using Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
estimation: Excluding products that use air transport
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Symmetric Border Wait Time (log) -0.268∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(-32.13) (-17.20) (-10.58) (-10.88)
Tariffs (log) -0.172∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗
(-22.44) (-4.74) (-11.43)
Border-Road Time Interaction -0.193∗∗∗
(-31.07)
Border-Distance Interaction -0.178∗∗∗
(-29.32)
N 14847 9926 9926 9926
R2 0.653 0.705 0.739 0.734
The dependent variable is growth in imports from 2008 to 2014 aggregated to 15 different sectors. All variables are
calculated by a 3 year average. Regressions are controlled for importer-year-sector and reporter-year-sector fixed effects.
t values reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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A.2 Model Details
A.2.1 Single Sector Setup with Comparative Statics
To set up the universal gravity model, let the world be comprised of a set S ∈ (1, . . . , N) of locations.
These locations can either be countries or smaller administrative areas. For each location, I denote Yi as the
gross income and Xij as the value of location j’s imports from location i. Trading between each location is
hampered by a corresponding trade friction represented by Kij > 0. This represents the trade costs that are
associated in trading between both locations such as, distance, time taken and tariffs. To account for many
of the micro founded characteristics found in modern trade models such as wages, prices, productivities and
labor endowments, I define, as in Allen et al. (2014) (γi) and (δj) to be the exporting and importing capacity
respectively. These two variables are solved endogenously within the general equilibrium model allowing
us to make fewer assumptions of the underlying mechanisms that many of the seminal trade models focus
on while still providing the same outcome. Allen et al. (2014) shows that 4 conditions must be met in this
framework in order to obtain the general equilibrium outcomes found in many of the current workhorse
trade models.
The first condition characterizes trade flows in a gravity like equation found in a variety of trade models.
Condition 1: For any countries i ∈ S and j ∈ S, the value of aggregate bilateral trade flows is given by
Xij = Kij(γi)(δj) (A.1)
For example in the Eaton and Kortom model the import shifters would be the income and competi-
tiveness of locations around location i and the export shifters would be the productivity and wages of the
exporting location. This equation was first introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and has gained significant em-
pirical traction over the years.
The next two conditions are concerned with assumptions of goods market clearing and trade balance
that are made in almost all trade models. Specifically,
Condition 2: For any location i ∈ S,
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Yi =
∑
j
Xij (A.2)
That is the total sum of all purchases from all locations, including its own location, is equal to their income
for all locations.
Condition 3: For any location i ∈ S,
Yi =
∑
j
Xji. (A.3)
That is all exports, including the “exports” to their own location, must equal to their income. Although
common in the trade literature, this condition rarely holds for countries. Allen et al. (2014) addresses this
concern and provides a strategy to account for unbalanced trade that will be included in estimation and the
counterfactual analysis.
The Universal Gravity model also assumes a log-linear parametric relationship between gross income
and the exporting and importing shifters.
Condition 4: For any location i ∈ S,
Yi = Biγ
α
i δ
β
i , (A.4)
where α ∈ IR and β ∈ IR are the gravity constants and Bi > 0 is an (exogenous) location specific shifter.
These gravity constants control the response income has on the importing and exporting shifters.
The last condition pins down the equilibrium trade flows by normalizing gross incomes, taking advan-
tage of Walras law.
Condition 5 World income equals to one.
∑
i
Yi = 1 (A.5)
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To define the equilibrium system of equations that satisfy these conditions we can use equations A.2 and
A.3 and substitute out Xij and Yi with equations A.1 and A.4. This gives
Biγ
α−1
i δ
β
i =
∑
j
Kijδj (A.6)
and
Biγ
α
i δ
β−1
i =
∑
j
Kjiδj (A.7)
and with equations A.3 and A.5, Condition 5 can be written as
∑
i
Biγ
α
i δ
β
i = 1 (A.8)
Therefore, Allen et al. (2014) state that for any given gravity constants (α and β), income shifter {Bi}
and the bilateral trade frictions {Kij}, the solution to the general equilibrium gravity model is defined by
the set of export shifters γi and shifters δi that satisfy equations A.6, A.7 and A.8.
A.2.2 Single Sector Comparative Statics
To see how trade frictions affect welfare and trade flows in the model, I take advantage of the work done
by Allen et al. (2014) who derive comparative statics for the importer exporter shifters. It is easy then to
show the general equilibrium effects for trade and welfare at any location given a change in bilateral trade
frictions between any two locations.
As in Allen et al (2014) let, X be an NxN matrix of observable trade flows where each < i, j >th
element is Xij and let Y be the NxX diagonal income matrix where Yi is the ith diagonal element. To define
expenditure of each location i, let Ei =
∑
j Xji and define E to be the NxN diagonal expenditure matrix
where the ith element is Ei. To ease notation, let
A ≡
(
(α− 1)Y βY− X
αE− XT (β − 1)Y
)
where A is obtained from implementing the implicit function theorem on equations A.3 and A.2 which
can be seen in appendix A.1. Define A+ to be the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of A and Akl to be the
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< k, l >th element A+. Allen et al. (2014) propose that if A has rank 2N-1 then
∂lnγl
∂lnKij
= Xij × (A+l,i +A+N+l,j + c)
and
∂lnδl
∂lnKij
= Xij × (A+N+l,i +A+l,j + c)
Where c is a scalar that is dependent on the normalization condition used for condition 5. Since trade
flows and location incomes are determined solely by the importer exporter shifters, it is easy to find close
formed solutions to the elasticities of trade flows and incomes with respect to trade frictions. Specifically,
the effect of changing i and j’s trade frictions on l and k’s trade flows can be expressed as
∂lnXkl
∂lnKij
=
∂lnγl
∂lnKij
+
∂lnδl
∂lnKij
= Xij × (A+N+l,i +A+l,j +A+l,i +A+N+l,j + 2c)
Similarly, the effect of changing i and j’s trade frictions on l’s income can be expressed as
∂lnYl
∂lnKij
= α
∂lnγl
∂lnKij
+ β
∂lnδl
∂lnKij
= Xij × (α(A+l,i +A+N+l,j + c) + β(A+N+l,i +A+l,j + c))
A.2.3 Comparative Statics and Calibration for Multi Sector Model
Comparative Statics
To calculate the comparative statics I follow the same method as in Allen (2014). Define yi ≡ ln γi,
zsi ≡ ln δsi and ksij ≡ lnKsij . Let ~y ≡ {yi} and ~zs ≡ {zsi } all be N × 1 vectors and let ~x ≡ {~y; ~z1; . . . ; ~zs}
be a (N + S) × 1 vector. Let ~ks ≡ {ksij} be a N2 × 1 vector and ~k ≡ { ~k1; . . . ; ~ks} be a SN2 × 1 vector.
Using our equilibrium conditions in equations ( ) and ( ) we can define a function
f(~x,~k) ≡
[
[Bi(exp{yi})α(
∏
s(exp{zi}θs)β)−
∑
s
1
Bsi
∑
jK
s
ij exp{yi} exp{zsj}]i
[Bi(exp{yi})α(
∏
s(exp{zi}θs)β)−
∑
s
∑
jK
s
ji exp{yj} exp{zsi }]i
]
Given the equilibrium conditions in the model:
f(~x,~k) = 0.
73
Fully differentiating and using the implicit function theorem gives:
f~xD~k(~x) + f~k = 0
where f~x is the 2N × (N + SN) matrix:
f~x =
(
(α− 1)Y βθ1Y −X1 . . . βθsY −Xs
αY −XT βθ1Y − E1 . . . βθsY − Es
)
Where Y is a N ×N diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal is equal to Yi, Es is a N ×N diagonal matrix
who’s ith diagonal is equal to
Esi =
∑
j
Ksji exp{yj} exp{zi}
or location i’s total expenditure on goods in sector s. X and Xs are the total and sector specific N ×N
trade matrices respectively. f~k is a 2N × SN2 matrix such that
f~k = (Φ
1 . . . Φs)
Where Φs are 2N ×N2 matrices given by
Φs = −

Xs11 . . . X
s
1N 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 Xs21 . . . X
s
2N . . .
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . XsN1 . . . X
s
NN
Xs11 . . . 0 X
s
21 . . . 0 . . . X
s
N1 . . . 0
0
. . .
... 0
. . .
... . . . 0
. . .
...
0 . . . Xs1N 0 . . . X
s
2N . . . 0 . . . X
s
NN

As in Allen (2014) I solve for D~k(~x) by using the moores psuedo inverse of f~x denoted as A
+
such that
D~k(~x) = −A+f~k
Therefore, the solution can be expressed as
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∂γl
∂Ksij
= Xsij(A
+
l,i +A
+
l,N+j)− csij
and
∂δs
′
l
∂Ksij
= Xsij(A
+
(s
′
N+l),i
+A+
(s′N+l),N+j
)− csij
To determine the value of c, I use the world income assumption in condition 5 1 which implies:
∑
l
Blγ
α
l (
∏
s
(δsi )
θs)β = Y W =⇒
∑
l
Yl
(
α
∂γl
∂Ksij
+
∑
s′
βθs′
∂δs
′
l
∂Ksij
)
= 0
Therefore
csij ≡
1
Y W (α+ β
∑
s′ θs′ )
Xsij
∑
l
Yl(α(A
+
l,i +A
+
l,N+j) +
∑
s′
β(A+
(s′N+l),i
+A+
(s′N+l),N+j
))
A.2.4 Solving Model for Counterfactuals
In this section I show, using work done by Allen et al (2014), how to solve the universal gravity model
using Schauder’s fixed point theorem both in a single and multi-sector case.
Single Sector
The key point in solving the general equilibrium trade model is to transform the model into a system of
equations where a fixed point can be obtained and is unique. 2 As in Allen et al. (2014), I begin by defining
xi ≡ Biγα−1i δβi and yi ≡ Biγαi δβ−1i . xi and yi are characterized by the left hand side of equation A.6 and
A.7 respectively. solving for γi and δi we get δi = x
α
β+α−1
i y
1−α
β+α−1
i B
1
β+α−1
i and γi = x
1−β
β+α−1
i y
β
β+α−1
i B
1
β+α−1
i .
Therefore the equilibrium conditions of equations A.6, A.7, and A.8 found in section A.1 can be rewritten
as
1This equation as described in Allen (2014) has infinitely many solutions that correspond to different normalizations that can be
applied by using Walras Law.
2See the online appendix of Allen et al. (2014) for proof of existence and uniqueness of a general mathematical system where
the GE gravity model is a member of.
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xi =
∑
j
KijB
1
1−α−β
j x
α
α+β−1
j y
1−α
α+β−1
j (A.9)
and
yi =
∑
j
KjiB
1
1−α−β
j x
1−β
α+β−1
j y
β
α+β−1
j (A.10)
with the world income set to 1 as the numeraire
1 =
∑
i
B
1
1−α−β
i x
α
α+β−1
i y
β
α+β−1
i . (A.11)
Allen et al 2014 show that to solve xi and yi we can transform equations A.9 and A.10 into a general
framework which has the property of having a unique fixed point. It can be shown using Schauder’s fixed
point theorem that for any positive F and H , and a, b, c there exists a solution to
xi =
∑
j Fi,jx
a
jy
b
j∑
i,j Fi,jx
a
jy
b
j
(A.12)
yi =
∑
j Hi,jx
c
jy
d
j∑
i,j Hi,jx
c
jy
d
j
(A.13)
It can then be shown that by letting
∑
j Fi,jx
a
jy
b
j =
∑
jKijB
1
1−α−β
j x
α
α+β−1
j y
1−α
α+β−1
j and
∑
j Hi,jx
c
jy
d
j =∑
iB
1
1−α−β
i x
α
α+β−1
i y
β
α+β−1
i that (x, y) is a solution to
x˜i =
∑
jKijB
1
1−α−β
j x˜
α
α+β−1
j y˜
1−α
α+β−1
j∑
i,jKijB
1
1−α−β
j x˜
α
α+β−1
j y˜
1−α
α+β−1
j
(A.14)
and
y˜i =
∑
jKjiB
1
1−α−β
j x˜
1−β
α+β−1
j y˜
β
α+β−1
j∑
i,jKjiB
1
1−α−β
j x˜
1−β
α+β−1
j y˜
β
α+β−1
j
(A.15)
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and (sx˜, y˜) = (x, y) is a solution to the general equilibrium trade model where
s =
(∑
i,j
Ki,jB
1
1−α−β
j x
α
α+β−1
j y
1−α
α+β−1
j
) 1
1− α
α+β−1 (A.16)
To satisfy the world income equation, another transformation must be made. Specifically let
t =
[∑
i
B
1
1−α−β
i (xi)
α
β+α−1 (yi)
β
β+α−1
]− 1−β
α−β
(A.17)
Then (x¯i, y¯i) =
(
t
α−1
1−β xi, tyi
)
satisfies (A.6) (A.7) and (A.8).3
Multi Sector Case
The strategy for solving the multi sector model follows the same strategy as the single sector model.
Again as in Allen et al (2014), I can redefine the system of equations found above to be
xi = Biγ
α−1
i (δi)
β
ysi = (δ
s
i )
−1
zi =
∏
s
(
(ysi )
θt
)(α−β)
δi =
∏
t
(δti)
θt
As before, we can express this system in terms of (xi, ysi , zi) by
δi = (zi)
− 1
α−β
γi = (Bi)
− 1
α−1 (xi)
1
α−1 (zi)
− β
(α−β)(α−1)
δsi = (y
s
i )
−1
To prove that this system can be uniquely solved the constraints α, β ≤ 0 and α − 1 ≤ β. With this
satisfied it can be shown that the system of equations
3See Appendix A.1 of Allen et al 2014 for full proof
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xi =
∑
s
∑
jKsij(Bj)
1
1−α (xj)
α
α−1 (ysj )
−1(zj)
β
(α−β)(α−1)∑
i,s,jK
s
ij(Bj)
1
1−α (xj)
α
α−1 (ysj )
−1(zj)
β
(α−β)(α−1)
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∑
jKsji(B
s
i )
−1(Bj)−
1
1−α (xj)
1
α−1 (ysj )
−1(zj)
β
(α−β)(α−1)
zi =
∏
s
(
(ysi )
θt
)α−β
Where
∑
i,s,j
(Bj)K
s
ij(Bj)
− α
1−α (xj)
α
α−1 (y8sj )
−1(zj)
β
(α−β)(α−1) = 1
A.3 Identification
A.3.1 Reverse Causality
Much of the border friction arises from the presence of too many trucks (or too much trade flow) for a
given amount of infrastructure. As an example, if a country had an exogenous shock of 10% to trade flows
resulting in a 1% increase in wait times at the border, this would lead to a large downward bias and over
estimation of the effect of wait times on trade flows.
Mathematical Description
Take from the gravity model the gravity equation that describes bilateral trade flows between country
pairs.
Xij = Kij(γi)(δj) (A.18)
where (γi) and (δj) are the exporting and importing capacity (or shifters) respectively. Kij represents
the (unobserved) trade frictions between country pair i and j. Many papers provide methods to back out
these trade frictions from either observed trade flows (of which can be done in this model), by using dif-
ferences in prices across geographical space and taking advantage of no arbitrage conditions or by trying to
observe trade costs directly by using proxies such as wait times, quality of roads indices, distance (if it is
cross sectional), etc.
In my paper I represent the unobserved trade functions as
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lnKij = Tijµ+ ij (A.19)
where Tij is the vector of observable trade costs. I claim that Tij can be represented by the amount of
time it takes to get to j from i. In my study region there are three main geographical obstacles that must
be accounted for. These are road travel, going across a border (sometimes many) and using ports for sea
transport. Looking only at African trade, this can be reduced to just borders and road travel (although I can
and do allow for trade by sea if that is indeed cheaper to do so). This could then be written as
Tij = ln(BorderT imeij(X˜ij) +RoadT imeij(X˜ij)) + νij (A.20)
X˜ij =
∑
n
∑
m
Xnm| n and m use same route i and j do. (A.21)
As we can see from equations A.20 and A.21 that border and road time can increase due to traffic con-
gestion which arises directly from the trade flows that pass through these locations. For roads,have a large
impact on time costs. Not accounting for this reverse causality would lead to biased estimates of µ. Next, I
will propose a method to account for this endogeneity and isolate the effects of trade frictions (due to travel
times) on trade flows. Past literature has demonstrated that road quality affects the speed at which you can
drive but that trucks will go certain speeds regardless to save on fuel, meaning that for most of the travel,
congestion on roads due to trade flows is not significant.4
Possible Solution: Reverse Causality Check
One solution is to check for reverse causality by looking at the individual effects of trade flows on the
border wait times by creating a measure that is independent of policy decisions and investment made during
that time period.
To check for reverse causality running a regressions such as
BorderT imeijt =
∑
c∈Ωij
(Bc) = β0 + β1Xijt + ijt (A.22)
4A potential second order concern would be that higher trade flows leads to more wear on the roads, reducing the quality and
subsequently the speed. But this effect takes a longer time to happen.
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where Ωij is the set of borders required to go from i to j using the shortest timed path, would lead to the
same endogenous issues that we had before since our main hypothesis is that border times affects trade flows.
One way to get around this is by creating a Bartik instrument for each bilateral pair i and j such that
X¯ijt =
Xij,t−1∑
j∈−iXij,t−1
∑
j∈−i
Xij,t. (A.23)
Equation A.23 predicts what trade flows would have been if the share of trade between i and j had stayed
at historical levels.5 Two benefits of this instrument are that it is independent of trade flows between i and
j (since we exclude i from the summation) and that it is unrelated to any changes in policy or investments
made by i and j.
For the first step we can regress 6 our Bartik measure on observed trade flows such that
lnXijt = β0 + β1lnX¯ijt + γit + δjt + ijt, (A.24)
where γit, δjt are exporter year and importer year fixed effects respectively.
With this we take the predicted values from equation A.24 and use this as the instrumental variable for
BorderT imeijt =
∑
c∈Ωij
(Bct) = α0 + α1(γˆ1lnX¯ijt) + γit + δjt + ijt. (A.25)
α1 will show the extent to which changes in trade flows relate to border wait times. If this measure is
statistically significant than there would be evidence that single bilateral trade flows have a non-zero impact
on border congestions and wait times leading to biased estimates of the main regression.
A.3.2 Comparing Calibration Techniques: First Order Approximation versus Solved Model Ap-
proach
As mentioned in section 5.2, calibrating parameters used in the general equilibrium model such that
5In equation A.23 it just has last year’s shares to represent historical levels. However, this can be extended to take the average
over many years prior to 2008 back to around 2001.
6The regression would be in long difference between 2008 and 2014.
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(α∗, β∗, θ∗1, . . . , θ
∗
s , µ
1∗, . . . , µs∗) = arg min
α,β∈IR,µ∈IRS∑
s
∑
i
∑
j
(
ln Xˆsij
observed − ln Xˆsij
predicted)2
. (A.26)
holds by solving the model for each iteration is computationally intensive. This section analyzes the
reliability of using the first order approximation approach outlined in Allen et al. (2014). This exercise
is done by conducting Monte Carlo simulations where the parameters of the model are known prior. The
simulated data is generated by creating a transportation friction dataset and solving the model for trade flows
using the model parameters. I then add an error terms to both the trade friction matrix and the generated
trade flow data and calibrate the model. Lastly, I perform a grid search method, once with the first order
approximation technique and again with solving the model. This is done for 1000 iterations. Figure A.2
shows the results with an added error term such that the average trade flow and transportation friction is 5%
different from the actual values. The average values of the parameters lie close to the real values assigned
and 95% of estimates laying less than one unit from the actual value.
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Figure A.2: 5 percent error terms for both trade flows and transport frictions
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF COMMODITY PRICES AND MINES ON
SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SATELLITE DATA
Section B.1 of this appendix provides additional tables for the main analysis and robustness checks.
Section B.2 includes additional results.
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: long term effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag(1) log difference in light -0.380∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(-405.09) (-405.01) (-404.99) (-399.56)
large mine x log diff in price 0.0143 0.0155 0.0129 0.00956
(0.34) (0.37) (0.31) (0.23)
medium mine x log diff in price -0.0717∗ -0.0793∗∗ -0.0830∗∗ -0.0891∗∗
(-1.80) (-1.99) (-2.07) (-2.23)
small mine x log diff in price -0.175∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(-5.72) (-6.14) (-6.24) (-6.44)
gov’t mine x log diff in price -0.261∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(-6.20) (-6.28) (-6.33) (-6.24)
large mine x lag(1) log diff in price -0.00247 -0.00282 0.00308
(-0.06) (-0.07) (0.07)
medium mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.0743∗ 0.0752∗ 0.0694∗
(1.87) (1.89) (1.73)
small mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.169∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(5.50) (5.54) (5.18)
gov’t mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(3.31) (3.30) (3.10)
large mine x lag(2) log diff in price -0.0140 -0.0258
(-0.34) (-0.61)
medium mine x lag(2) log diff in price -0.0303 -0.0232
(-0.77) (-0.57)
small mine x lag(2) log diff in price -0.0544∗ -0.0524∗
(-1.80) (-1.69)
large mine x lag(3) log diff in price 0.00525
(0.13)
medium mine x lag(3) log diff in price -0.0558
(-1.42)
small mine x lag(3) log diff in price -0.108∗∗∗
(-3.60)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 892164 892164 892164 845208
R2 0.365 0.368 0.371 0.375
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All estimates use country-year fixed
effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation.
Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.2: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: By iron copper and tin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
iron mine x log diff in price 0.0139 -0.00302 0.0585 0.0512
(0.46) (-0.08) (1.44) (1.19)
copper mine x log diff in price -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0842∗∗ -0.0960∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(-3.08) (-2.13) (-2.40) (-5.74)
tin mine x log diff in price -0.126∗∗ -0.123∗ -0.104∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.65) (-3.15)
iron mine x lag(1) log diff in price -0.0149 0.198∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(-0.36) (4.07) (3.72)
copper mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.0490 0.0392 0.117∗∗
(1.05) (0.77) (2.37)
tin mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.0204 0.169∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.79) (2.79) (4.80)
iron mine x lag(2) log diff in price 0.269∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(7.29) (12.53)
copper mine x lag(2) log diff in price 0.0416 -0.153∗∗∗
(0.86) (-3.01)
tin mine x lag(2) log diff in price -0.173∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
(-2.68) (-6.12)
iron mine x lag(3) log diff in price 0.396∗∗∗
(9.35)
copper mine x lag(3) log diff in price 0.0442
(0.84)
tin mine x lag(3) log diff in price 0.287∗∗∗
(3.73)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 939120 939120 939120 892164
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.3: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: By aluminum, coal and zinc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
aluminum mine x log diff in price -0.0245 -0.0520 -0.1000 -0.260∗∗∗
(-0.33) (-0.58) (-1.11) (-2.99)
coal mine x log diff in price 0.123 0.158 0.191 0.164
(0.96) (1.18) (1.39) (1.16)
zinc mine x log diff in price -0.0986∗∗∗ -0.0940∗∗ -0.0825∗∗ -0.0561
(-2.87) (-2.51) (-2.08) (-1.45)
aluminum mine x lag(1)log diff in price -0.0458 0.206∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(-0.58) (2.24) (4.75)
coal mine x lag(1)log diff in price 0.0673 0.172 0.150
(0.82) (1.24) (1.01)
zinc mine x lag(1)log diff in price 0.00803 -0.00527 0.0308
(0.28) (-0.15) (0.82)
aluminum mine x lag(2)log diff in price 0.428∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(5.40) (7.19)
coal mine x lag(2)log diff in price -0.113 -0.143
(-0.82) (-0.96)
zinc mine x lag(2)log diff in price 0.0261 0.0863
(0.68) (1.64)
aluminum mine x lag(3)log diff in price 0.330∗∗∗
(4.24)
coal mine x lag(3)log diff in price 0.0591
(0.38)
zinc mine x lag(3)log diff in price -0.116∗∗∗
(-3.06)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 939120 939120 939120 892164
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.4: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: By gold, silver and nickel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
gold mine x log diff in price -0.163∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(-7.95) (-7.90) (-6.59) (-5.38)
silver mine x log diff in price 0.395∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(9.27) (9.38) (9.06) (6.35)
nickel mine x log diff in price -0.152∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗
(-2.95) (-3.56) (-3.62) (-3.84)
gold mine x lag(1)log diff in price -0.0266 -0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0167
(-1.49) (-3.05) (0.72)
silver mine x lag(1)log diff in price -0.00870 0.116∗∗ 0.0132
(-0.62) (2.40) (0.28)
nickel mine x lag(1)log diff in price -0.0670∗∗ -0.0421 0.0731
(-2.11) (-0.79) (1.37)
gold mine x lag(2)log diff in price 0.0665∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗
(2.86) (2.93)
silver mine x lag(2)log diff in price -0.148∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
(-2.82) (-4.05)
nickel mine x lag(2)log diff in price -0.0324 -0.129∗
(-0.61) (-1.75)
gold mine x lag(3)log diff in price -0.121∗∗∗
(-5.21)
silver mine x lag(3)log diff in price 0.322∗∗∗
(4.89)
nickel mine x lag(3)log diff in price 0.0328
(0.57)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 939120 939120 939120 892164
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.5: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mine x growth in price (ln) -0.180∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗
(-13.21) (-12.53) (-12.09) (-12.78)
bureaucratic quality x mine x growth in prices (ln) 0.00169 0.00200 0.00247
(0.65) (0.77) (0.95)
bureaucratic quality x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.00419∗∗∗ -0.00402∗∗∗ -0.00455∗∗∗
(-3.60) (-3.45) (-3.90)
Law and Order x mine x growth in prices (ln) 0.00378∗∗∗ 0.00457∗∗∗ 0.00284∗∗∗
(5.55) (6.44) (3.77)
Law and Order x mine x lag(1) growth in prices (ln) 0.00426∗∗∗ 0.00427∗∗∗ 0.00392∗∗∗
(4.50) (4.50) (4.13)
corruption x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.00624∗∗∗ -0.00608∗∗∗ -0.00680∗∗∗
(-9.59) (-9.09) (-9.99)
corruption x mine x lag(1) growth in prices (ln) -0.00335∗∗∗ -0.00322∗∗∗ -0.00331∗∗∗
(-3.45) (-3.31) (-3.40)
gov’t stability x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.000200 0.000207
(-1.23) (1.23)
internal conflict x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.00125∗∗∗ -0.00221∗∗∗
(-4.15) (-6.91)
Accountability x mine x growth in prices (ln) 0.000653 0.000508
(1.55) (1.18)
ethnic tension x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.000725
(-1.23)
external conflict x mine x growth in prices (ln) 0.00219∗∗∗
(7.00)
military control x mine x growth in prices (ln) -0.000263
(-0.58)
religious control x mine x growth in prices (ln) 0.00453∗∗∗
(7.20)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 574056 550948 550948 550948
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.6: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Spillover effects and local
effects on cities/capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mine x growth in price (ln) -0.121∗∗∗ -0.0877∗∗∗ -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.0952∗∗∗
(-7.85) (-5.38) (-4.69) (-4.70)
mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0712∗∗∗
(8.88) (4.16) (4.16) (3.56)
adjacent mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0636∗∗∗ -0.0638∗∗∗ -0.0637∗∗∗
(-7.28) (-7.29) (-7.29)
adjacent mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(13.56) (13.56) (13.56)
mine x growth of price x country capital -0.0250 -0.0229
(-0.18) (-0.17)
mine x growth of price x state capital 0.0267 0.0262
(0.51) (0.50)
mine x growth of price x large city 0.0162 0.0166
(0.49) (0.50)
mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) x country capital -0.0992
(-0.74)
mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) x state capital 0.0313
(0.61)
mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) x large city -0.0189
(-0.58)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 939120 939120 939120 939120
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.7: Institution Clusters
Total
Mean Std
Bureaucratic Quality 2.16 1.25
Law and Order 3.9 1.31
Corruption 2.96 1.32
Cluster 1
Mean Std Std’s away from the mean
Bureaucratic Quality 2.08 0.474 -0.06
Law and Order 2.95 0.677 -0.73
Corruption 3.01 0.64 0.04
Cluster 2
Mean Std Std’s away from the mean
Bureaucratic Quality 3.5 0.474 1.07
Law and Order 5.23 0.677 1.02
Corruption 4.57 0.64 1.22
Cluster 3
Mean Std Std’s away from the mean
Bureaucratic Quality 0.71 1.08 -1.16
Law and Order 2.15 0.81 -1.34
Corruption 1.55 0.88 -1.07
Cluster 4
Mean Std Std’s away from the mean
Bureaucratic Quality 1.73 0.5 -0.34
Law and Order 4.3 0.58 0.31
Corruption 2.22 0.59 -0.56
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Clusters were determined by countries’ bureaucratic quality, level of
corruption and rule of law measures.
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Table B.8: Institutional Clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Australia Argentina Angola Albania
Austria Botswana Burkina Faso Algeria
Belgium Brazil El Salvador Bangladesh
Brunei Bulgaria Ethiopia Bolivia
Chile Cameroon Guinea Colombia
Denmark China Guinea-Bissau Guatemala
Finland Costa Rica Guyana Haiti
Germany Cuba Indonesia Honduras
Hungary Dominican Republic Malawi Iraq
Iceland Ecuador Mali Kenya
Iran Egypt Myanmar Liberia
Italy Gabon Nicaragua Madagascar
Japan Gambia Panama Niger
Luxembourg Ghana Peru Nigeria
Namibia Greece Romania Paraguay
Netherlands India Sierra Leone Somalia
New Zealand Jordan Suriname Sudan
Norway Malaysia Tanzania
Portugal Mexico Togo
South Africa Mongolia Uganda
South Korea Morocco Uruguay
Spain Mozambique Vietnam
Sweden Oman Zambia
Switzerland Pakistan
Turkey Papua New Guinea
United Kingdom Poland
United States Russia
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Syria
Taiwan
Thailand
Tunisia
Venezuela
Yemen
Zimbabwe
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Clusters were determined by countries’ bureaucratic quality, level of
corruption and rule of law measures.
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Table B.9: Conflict Clusters
Total
Mean STD
Internal Conflict 9.52 2.16
External Conflict 10.17 1.81
Ethnic Tension 4.15 1.29
Cluster 1
Mean STD STDs away from the mean
Internal Conflict 11.17 2.25 0.76
External Conflict 11.31 1.31 0.63
Ethnic Tension 4.69 1.65 0.42
Cluster 2
Mean STD STDs away from the mean
Internal Conflict 5.84 0.83 -1.70
External Conflict 5.61 0.71 -2.52
Ethnic Tension 2.89 0.9 -0.98
Cluster 3
Mean STD STDs away from the mean
Internal Conflict 9.8 1.71 0.13
External Conflict 9.48 1.1 -0.38
Ethnic Tension 5 0.85 0.66
Cluster 4
Mean STD STDs away from the mean
Internal Conflict 7.78 1.03 -0.81
External Conflict 10.46 1.01 0.16
Ethnic Tension 2.88 0.74 -0.98
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Clusters were determined by countries’ level of internal conflict,
external conflict and ethnic tension.
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Table B.10: Conflict clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Argentina Angola Albania Algeria
Australia Colombia Belarus Bangladesh
Austria Guinea Bulgaria Bolivia
Belgium India Burkina Faso Brazil
Botswana Iraq Chile Cameroon
Brunei Liberia Costa Rica Ecuador
China Nigeria Croatia Gabon
Czech Republic Pakistan Cuba Guatemala
Denmark Somalia Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau
Finland Sudan Egypt Haiti
Gambia Uganda El Salvador Indonesia
Germany Zimbabwe Ethiopia Kenya
Ghana Greece Latvia
Guyana Honduras Madagascar
Hungary Iran Mozambique
Iceland Italy Myanmar
Luxembourg Japan Namibia
Malawi Jordan Niger
Malaysia Morocco Paraguay
Mali Nicaragua Peru
Mexico Oman Russia
Mongolia Panama Senegal
Netherlands South Korea Sierra Leone
New Zealand Syria Spain
Norway Thailand Sri Lanka
Papua New Guinea Uruguay Togo
Poland Yemen Turkey
Portugal Zambia Ukraine
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Tanzania
Tunisia
United
Kingdom
Venezuela
Vietnam
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Clusters were determined by countries’ level of internal conflict,
external conflict and ethnic tension.
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Table B.11: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Ownership and size of
mines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag (1) log diff in sum light -0.380∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗
(-405.13) (-405.13) (-405.09) (-405.09)
mine x log diff in price -0.175∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(-12.29) (-11.18)
gov’t mine x log diff in price -0.204∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(-4.78) (-6.20)
large mine x log diff in price 0.00225 0.0143
(0.05) (0.34)
medium mine x log diff in price -0.0845∗∗ -0.0717∗
(-2.13) (-1.80)
small mine x log diff in price -0.180∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(-5.87) (-5.72)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 892164 892164 892164 892164
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.12: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Size and development state
of resources
(1) (2) (3) (4)
present large mine x growth in price (ln) 0.00981 0.0263
(0.21) (0.53)
present medium mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0685 -0.0554
(-1.51) (-1.16)
present small mine x growth in price (ln) -0.125∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(-3.58) (-2.25)
future large mine x growth in price (ln) -0.00802 0.0293
(-0.12) (0.41)
future medium mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0769 -0.0142
(-1.30) (-0.22)
past small mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0882∗∗ -0.0318
(-2.51) (-0.70)
future large mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0877 -0.0711
(-1.13) (-0.88)
future medium mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0836 -0.0540
(-1.20) (-0.74)
future small mine x growth in price (ln) -0.0901∗∗ 0.0167
(-2.43) (0.31)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 939120 939120 939120 939120
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table B.13: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Size and development state
with lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
present large mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.00742 0.00850
(0.16) (0.17)
present medium mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.0892∗∗ 0.0983∗∗
(2.01) (2.09)
present small mine x lag growth in price (ln) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗
(3.10) (2.25)
future large mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) -0.00254 -0.0545
(-0.04) (-0.77)
future medium mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.0169 -0.0578
(0.29) (-0.91)
past small mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0658
(3.34) (1.48)
future large mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.0454 0.0284
(0.60) (0.36)
future medium mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.102 0.0785
(1.48) (1.09)
future small mine x lag(1) growth in price (ln) 0.0752∗∗ -0.0512
(2.07) (-0.98)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding US and China Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 939120 939120 939120 939120
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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B.2 Additional Analysis
B.2.1 Asymmetric Effects
To allow for possible asymmetries of price effects, I split ∆Pt−1 into two groups. Let
∆P+t−1 = max[0,∆Pt−1].
∆P−t−1 = min[0,∆Pt−1].
I can then rewrite equation 2 as
∆yi,t = β1(∆P
+
t−1 ∗M toti ) + β2(∆P−t−1 ∗M toti ) + φ˜c,t + ∆i,t. (B.1)
Appendix Table B.14 splits prices into positive and negative growth periods. Positive price changes see
a consistent negative relationship especially short term. However there appears to be evidence for a positive
relationship when looking at negative price changes. Using column 9 we see that the lagged negative price
changes have a higher magnitude effect on light growth than lagged positive price changes. One explanation
for this is that when prices increase, part of the revenue from mining activity goes to major metropolitan
areas as suggested by (Galina 2014). The remainder is distributed to miners and and other operators located
in populated areas close to the mine but this too could leave the mining cities since many miners relocate
and send money back to their prior location where they will return to. However when prices fall it may lead
to mass lay offs that affect how many people are living in these communities near mining areas.
B.2.2 Alternate Spillover Measure
A third method of measuring spillover effects adds the number of resource areas together but discounts
the resource area with respect to the distance between the district of interest and the resource location such
that
ResourceAccessi =
∑
j∈S
Resj
Distij
.
To check if this method provides additional benefits over the state wide spillover method, I calculate
the resource access for Canada and provide regression analysis to compare the two. Appendix Table B.15
shows that both methods provide similar results. Therefore, since there are nearly 47,000 district within my
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Table B.14: Growth of total light from price changes and resource abundance: Aggregated Resource with
positive and negative price change measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
logMine×PosPrice Lag1 -0.00868∗∗∗ -0.00868∗∗∗ -0.00878∗∗∗ -0.00428∗∗∗ -0.00435∗∗∗ -0.00437∗∗∗ -0.00536∗∗∗ -0.00529∗∗∗ -0.00510∗∗∗
(-9.25) (-9.24) (-9.31) (-5.31) (-5.38) (-5.39) (-5.71) (-5.63) (-5.42)
logMine×NegPrice Lag1 0.000115 0.000372 -0.000198 0.00352∗∗∗ 0.00189 0.00197 0.00440∗∗∗ 0.00581∗∗∗ 0.00794∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.26) (-0.13) (4.36) (1.54) (1.50) (4.69) (3.61) (4.57)
logMine×PosPrice Lag2 0.000465 0.0000718 -0.00215∗ -0.00198 0.00152 0.00349∗∗
(0.33) (0.05) (-1.76) (-1.53) (0.95) (2.04)
logMine×NegPrice Lag2 -0.000633 -0.00227 -0.000134 -0.000340 0.00121 0.00541∗∗∗
(-0.67) (-1.51) (-0.17) (-0.26) (1.29) (3.16)
logMine×PosPrice Lag3 -0.00268∗ -0.000783 0.00466∗∗∗
(-1.75) (-0.59) (2.69)
logMine×NegPrice Lag1 0.00251∗∗∗ 0.00229∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗
(2.66) (2.82) (2.85)
lnSumLight Lag1 -0.499∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(-593.04) (-592.99) (-592.87) (-571.16) (-571.09) (-570.98)
Exclude China & U.S No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1013410 1013158 1012906 1013410 1013158 1012906 936590 936340 936090
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
sample, the resource access method would be computationally intensive for little benefit.
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Table B.15: Effect of commodity price and resource abundance on light growth: Comparing resource access
measure with statewide spill over method in Canada
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mine x log diff in price -0.0768 -0.122 -0.136 -0.127
(-0.65) (-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.94)
# state mine x log diff in price -0.172∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(-4.86) (-5.01) (-5.32) (-5.01)
resource access (ln) x log diff in price 0.160 0.0217 0.0236 0.0236
(0.02) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
mine x lag(1) log difference in price 0.331∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.366∗∗
(2.26) (2.21) (2.17)
# state mine x lag(1) log diff in price 0.173∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(4.17) (4.46) (4.64)
resource access (ln) x lag(1) log diff in price 0.177∗ 0.181∗ 0.187∗
(1.86) (1.81) (1.75)
mine x lag(2) log diff in price 0.0573 0.0252
(0.61) (0.25)
# state mine x lag(2) log diff in price -0.876 -0.0181
(-0.28) (-0.55)
resource access (ln) x lag(2) log diff in price -0.0750 -0.0635
(-1.19) (-0.94)
mine x lag(3) log diff in price -0.609
(-0.05)
# state mine x lag(3) log diff in price -0.0433
(-1.25)
resource access (ln) x lag(3) log diff in price 0.129
(0.02)
N 5860 5860 5567 5274
The dependent variable is growth in log sum of light from 1992 to 2013 with mineral resources not aggregated. All
estimates use country-year fixed effects and district fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) allow for spatial correlation
within a 1000km radius and a 20 year serial correlation. Significance levels are: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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